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Social exchange underpins social structure and as such, social exchange theory has 
taken a central role in the field of social psychology. The study of exchange rules 
and how they interact with each other is an area within this theory that has not 
received much attention up until now. This study has aimed to study the exchange 
rules of fairness, reciprocity, self-interest, vicinity and ingroup favouritism within an 
interacting exchange network. Agent based computational modelling with a 
comparison to empirical data has been proposed as a novel method to uncover the 
process of exchange from the bottom up. The results of the study indicate that there 
exists no universal combination of exchange rules that can predict human behaviour 
in all settings. Exchange rules are adopted based on institutional norms as well as 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Social exchange is an important component of interaction between individuals. Most 
people are likely to go through many exchanges in a single day. For this reason, the 
study of social exchange under the banner of social exchange theory has been at 
the forefront of social psychology for nearly half a century. Social exchange theory 
can be traced back to the early 20th century but was most notably introduced by 
George Homans in 1958. Homans (1958) was interested in the microprocesses of 
social exchange and how that led to the formation of macrosocial structure. He 
argued that individuals weigh up cost and rewards when deciding on potential 
exchanges. His assumption of rationality has been argued by many, yet the 
theoretical groundwork that he laid has held.  
Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) highlighted the valid point that social exchange 
theory has great explanatory power for understanding human interaction but that it 
suffers from areas of conceptual ambiguity and a general lack of fully specified core 
conceptualisations. One area, according to Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005), that has 
suffered a great lack of research within the social exchange framework is the area of 
exchange rules. Exchange rules according to Meeker (1971) are the normative 
guidelines that direct decisions made by individuals in exchange situations.  
Drawing from recent empirical literature on the motivations behind exchange 
behaviour, this research has set out to resurrect the important groundwork that 
Meeker laid by proposing a reconceptualised model of social exchange with the 
specific exchange rules of reciprocity, ingroup favouritism, self-interest, fairness and 
proximity. A random giving exchange rule was added to these five in order to 
account for careless or uncertain decision making. 
Research on these exchange rules have largely been done one rule at a time or at 
most two (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). This means that the expected interaction 
between these exchange rules has not been assessed.  
A potential reason for the shortage of research on the interaction of exchange rules 
is the methodological difficulties in studying the process of exchange. Computational 
agent-based modelling has been proposed in the current research as a methodology 
that can effectively model exchange behaviour from agent level decision making.  
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Using every combination between exchange rules at three levels of each rule, 729 
simulations were run in total. The results of the agent-based model have then been 
quantitatively compared to empirical data derived from human experiments in order 
to validate the simulated results. The particular exchange rules or combinations of 
exchange rules used in the most accurate simulations are used to indicate the 





Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
 
Social Exchange Theory 
 
Social exchange theory, most notably defined by Homans (1958) is a theory that 
attempts to describe social structure as the product of microsocial exchanges 
between individuals. In this theory, it is assumed that individuals, when faced with a 
potential exchange, will calculate the costs and rewards of the exchange so as to 
maximise gains and minimize costs.  
The early work of Homans focussed on sub-institutional exchange processes and 
attempted to explain larger social structures as a product of microsocial behaviour 
(Cook, Cheshire, Rice, & Nakagawa, 2013). His claim was that emergent social 
phenomena can always be explained by attributes of individuals in interaction. His 
work was eventually deemed overly reductionistic as it did not take into account 
larger institutional influences that shape microsocial behaviour. In addition to this, it 
did not take into account the macrosocial phenomena that emerges from social 
interaction which simply cannot be reduced to the actions of individuals (Cook et al., 
2013). The work of Blau (1968) and Emerson (1976) evolved this theory to account 
for these shortfalls. 
Social exchange theory has gone on to explain dynamics within exchange networks 
such as power (structural inequality between groups or individuals), commitment, 
emotion and fairness considerations as a few examples of forces that shape 
exchange within networks (Cook et al., 2013). In short, larger cultural and contextual 
norms, as well as institutional forces, can shape exchange behaviour and the 
resulting emerged macrosocial structure.  
In the original conception of social exchange theory, rationality was assumed. This 
posits that individuals will make rational decisions regarding the outcomes of an 
exchange. Conflicting occurrences of irrational behaviour, such as revenge seeking 
where individuals incur a cost if it means getting back at another, led Meeker (1971) 
to argue against the assumed rationality that underpins exchange decisions. She 
argued for a far narrower conception of rationality whereby individuals are rational in 
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that they will evaluate consequences of an exchange but not necessarily aim for 
profit maximisation (Meeker, 1971). This thinking led to the theory of exchange as 
individual decisions guided by a framework of rules that are relied upon for making 
decisions regarding the mode of exchange.  
Rules of exchange  
 
Exchange relationships are formed by exchange, and for this exchange to take place 
there need be a set of rules that guide and govern exchange. These “exchange 
rules” are normative prescriptions for behaviour that guide the exchange process 
between individuals (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). A simple example of an 
exchange rule, and the one most frequently relied upon in exchange research, is 
reciprocity. Reciprocity is a rule that influences an individual to return kind favours 
directed towards them during past exchange.  
Meeker (1971) argued that exchanges between individuals can be considered as 
individual decisions and that these decisions require a set of rules to guide decision 
making. In this logic, she specified six decision rules of altruism, ingroup gain, status 
consistency, competition and reciprocation. These rules are further elaborated on 
below. 
• Altruism can be defined as a decision rule that has the aim of rewarding 
another individual even if that means a complete cost to the giver.  
• Ingroup gain, as defined by Meeker (1971), is a rule that leads to the 
maximum reward for all individuals concerned. This can be thought of as a 
common storehouse of resources that individuals use as needed. This 
decision rule then does not include interpersonal exchange. 
• Status consistency is a rule that seeks to maintain the status that exists 
before the exchange begins. This decision rule then uses the logic of 
individual A having a higher payoff in an exchange than individual B if 
individual A has a higher status at the beginning of the exchange. 
• Competition is a rule that seeks the maximum difference in payoffs between 
individuals in an exchange. This can even mean a reduced reward for the 
giver if it means harming the receiver.  
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• Reciprocation is a rule that seeks to reward past acts of kindness. This rule 
maintains a cooperative set of exchanges.  
Meeker (1971) argues that these exchange rules are not mutually exclusive, and that 
more than one rule can be adopted at one time if they are in line with the particular 
goal structure. For example, an individual could adopt a rule of altruism and ingroup 
gain without any conflict between rules. A few questions are generated from 
Meeker’s framework, the first being; what contextual factors lead to combinations of 
decision rules being adopted? Another question that is highlighted is; what factors 
induce preference to one rule over another and what facilitates the shift from one 
rule to another?   
Answering these questions requires specific focus on the normative and structural 
context in which the interaction is imbedded. Exchange rules are either sanctioned or 
inhibited by a contextual or larger social norm. If we consider rationality that has 
been a popular assumption in social exchange theory, we would argue that an 
individual would seek the decision rule that would allow them the maximum payoff 
with little regard of the consequences for the exchange partner. This would be in line 
with the homo-economicus model which assumes pure rationality with no social 
constraints to profit maximisation. As discussed later in this review, this behaviour 
can exist, but is seldom seen empirically. One reason for this is that self-interest is 
often constrained by conflicting norms. For example, if in a certain context there 
exists a social norm that punishes selfishness, it would then force the individual to 
adopt an exchange rule that accrues the largest benefit without being deemed 
selfish. Using this logic, one could also logically conclude that a decision rule that is 
highly competitive would not be suitable in a context where fairness to the poor is 
highly esteemed. In this context, an individual would likely adopt an exchange rule 
that gives preference to giving to the poor. An exchange rule that fosters 
cooperation, such as reciprocity, may also be suitable in this context.  
The fundamental tension between rationality and exchange rules that are 
normatively prescribed by the context constitute an institutional force that will alter 
microsocial exchange as well as emergent macrosocial phenomena. The 
implications of the lack of research in this area are that competition between rules 
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under different circumstances are not fully understood, nor are the cases when 
multiple exchange rules are used in combinations.  
The current research is aimed at studying the process of exchange with focus on 
which exchange rules individuals adopt in different contexts. This research will focus 





Toward a reconceptualised set of exchange rules 
 
Research on exchange rules has evolved substantially since Meeker’s original 
contribution, and a reconceptualised model is warranted. A large literature from the 
field of economics, sociology and social psychology has sought to understand the 
psychological motivations of exchange behaviour. This research has generally 
studied exchange rules in isolation. Though the empirical support for these 
mechanisms is given, the current research will aim to study how these interact with 
each other. Drawing on this literature, there has been much empirical evidence for 
reciprocity, ingroup favouritism, fairness or inequity aversion, proximity and self-
interest. The following section of the review will focus on detailing recent empirical 
support for each of these proposed exchange rules. 
Reciprocity 
 
Reciprocation in its essential form is the behavioural response by a recipient to an 
action targeted towards them. The response could be positive, such as a reward for 
kindness, or it could take a negative form which would entail punishment for an 
unkind action (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). This section will outline the decision-
making process involved in reciprocation as well as outline the theoretical 
components of reciprocation in social exchange. 
Reciprocation is a fundamental component of social organisation and is a powerful 
driving force behind behaviour (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). Gouldner (1960) goes so 
far as to argue that reciprocity is a universal mechanism that can be found in every 
culture. Gouldner (1960) in fact wrote the famous quote: 
“A norm of reciprocity is, I suspect, no less universal and important an element of 
culture than the incest taboo, although, similarly, its concrete formulations may vary 
with time and place.” (p. 171). 
The manner in which reciprocity presents itself and the determinates of how one 
should reciprocate will differ in different contexts and social spheres. The universal 
component of reciprocation as argued by Gouldner (1960) can be summarised in two 
basic rules; the first being that individuals should repay kind acts that have been 
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directed towards them, and the second being that individuals should not harm those 
that have acted kindly towards them. 
At this point it is necessary to distinguish two conceptually different forms of 
reciprocation. The first of these two, and indeed the more traditional understanding 
of reciprocation, is known as direct reciprocity. This type of reciprocity is a simple ‘tit 
for tat’ reciprocation, or, as Nowak and Sigmund (2005) quite succinctly define it; 
“you scratch my back and I will scratch yours” (p. 1).  
The second form of reciprocation is known as indirect reciprocity, and this is defined 
as the type of reciprocation where a receiver will not directly reciprocate to the giver, 
but to someone else. In this mode of reciprocation, a giver is likely to give to any 
agent that has been seen to help others in the past (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). 
Indirect reciprocity is more focussed on reputation with the avoidance of negative 
consequences (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005).  
In the current research, focus is directed towards interaction between multiple 
exchange rules and mathematical tractability is of concern. For this reason, only 
direct reciprocity will be of focus. 
The best-known research on direct reciprocation is the work of Axelrod (1984), in 
which reciprocation was studied using the game ‘the prisoners dilemma”. This 
research will be briefly detailed below. 
The prisoner’s dilemma 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma is a simple game that entails two players. Each player has a 
choice of whether to cooperate with the other player or to defect. The players must 
choose their course of action without knowing what the other player will do. If player 
1 chooses to defect and player 2 chooses to cooperate, player one will have a higher 
pay off than if he/she had chosen to cooperate. The dilemma is introduced when 
both players choose to defect, if they select defection their payoff will be less than if 
they had cooperated. 
In order to study the emergence of cooperation through reciprocation, Axelrod 
developed a research design that took the form of a tournament. Participants were 
mostly professors from the fields of economics, mathematics, psychology and 
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sociology. Each participant was tasked with developing a rule that would be used to 
model strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma game. All strategies were able to use 
history in order to make future choices. Strategies submitted varied between highly 
complex rules that aimed at maximum long-term payoff to simple rules that mimicked 
the opponents previous move. Each participant was paired with an opponent in one 
condition, as well as a condition in which they would oppose a clone. For a 
theoretical baseline, the participant was also paired with a random strategy that 
randomly chose either to defect or to cooperate in each round. 
Two trials were held and in both trials the strategy “tit for tat” was the strategy that 
accrued the highest average number of points. This strategy was a simple rule that 
cooperated (didn’t defect) in the first round and then reciprocated in either a positive 
or negative way in every proceeding round. The success derived through this simple 
strategy was due to a few behavioural traits that it possessed. The first of these was 
that it was kind. This strategy would never be the player to defect first. It set a 
baseline of initial cooperation, but if crossed, it would be quick to punish by defecting 
in the subsequent round. Tit for tat was very forgiving, after its initial retaliation, it 
would forgive and forget all previous cheating. The forgiveness was a critical 
component to its success as it fostered and restored cooperation between players. 
The research conducted by Axelrod (1984) clearly demonstrated the dramatic effect 
that reciprocity has in guiding behaviour in social settings. A limitation of this study is 
that reciprocity is studied in dyadic relationships. In real world situations, individuals 
have a far greater population of people that they are able to interact with. If an 
individual were to be faced with cheating in a larger group, it is likely that they would 
punish the opponent by taking their business elsewhere, thereby removing any 




Increased wealth vs underlying intentions 
 
A factor of reciprocation that warrants discussion is the motivational factors when 
deciding on reciprocating. When evaluating a token exchange, there are two main 
factors that would lead to reciprocation, the individual would either base their 
response on the increased wealth or the perceived intentions of the generous giver 
(Falk & Fischbacher, 2006).  
The simpler of the two would be the increased wealth obtained through the token 
exchange. This could be a powerful determinate for reciprocation which would 
become more important as the receiving agent’s wealth decreases.  
The second factor would be the intentions behind the token allocation. This 
incorporates both the increase in wealth as well as the social meaning behind the 
giving. The interpretation of the intentions behind the token allocation will then prove 
to be a large deciding factor in whether or not to reciprocate (Keysar, Converse, 
Wang, & Epley, 2008). 
Recent empirical evidence has suggested that the perceived intentions of a helpful 
action from one individual to another has a large impact on the degree to which 
people are inclined to engage in direct reciprocity (Orhun, 2018). If the original giver 
is deemed to be self-interested and not altruistic in their behaviour, people are less 
likely to reciprocate.  
Ingroup favouritism 
 
Ingroup favouritism, the tendency to favour one’s own group and to discriminate 
against the outgroup, is a robust phenomenon in social exchange. Nearly a century 
of research has aimed to uncover and explain the determinants of this behaviour. In 
this section of the review, a brief overview of historical research will be discussed, 
following that, current research exploring ingroup favouritism will be reviewed. 
The realistic conflict studies had the aim of assessing the development of ingroup 
favouritism in response to competition for resources. It was hypothesised that 
competition for resources between groups would lead to participants discriminating 
against the outgroup and favouring the ingroup (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & 
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Sherif, 1988). It was further hypothesised that this conflict could be reduced through 
cooperation.  
The experiment started with a formation phase where participants were placed into 
groups and were given goals that would foster cooperation between group members. 
This phase led to the formation of a common sense of group membership. The 
second phase introduced competitive activities with the promise of the winning group 
receiving a prize. The introduction of competition quickly led to outgroup derogation 
and a strengthening of ingroup favouritism. The groups became more cohesive and 
more polarized from each other.  
The study led by Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) was instrumental in 
demonstrating the effect that competition can have on a sense of group identity and 
ingroup favouritism. Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) argued that competition 
was not necessary for the formation of ingroup favouritism and discriminatory 
behaviour targeted towards the outgroup. Instead, they argued that the mere 
classification of a group and one’s membership in this group could lead to ingroup 
favouritism and discrimination towards the outgroup. Tajfel et al. (1971) successfully 
demonstrated this theory with the minimal group studies. 
In this pioneering study, Tajfel and his team used a novel method to introduce 
knowledge of one’s group with the most minimal salience. They set out to find the 
baseline condition upon which the social categorization and resulting ingroup 
intergroup discrimination would take place. In order to study ingroup favouritism with 
a minimal group setting, three criteria had to be enforced (Otten, 2016). Firstly, the 
categorization had to be arbitrary and the groups had to be new, meaning they may 
not have had any other previous experience with these group boundaries. Secondly, 
interaction had to be eliminated to remove extraneous variables such as 
reciprocation. Thirdly, self-interest had to be constrained in order to accurately 
measure ingroup favouritism instead of selfishness (Otten, 2016). Participants were 
requested to choose between two paintings and were then told that they were 
assigned to a group based on their choice. They were in fact randomly assigned to 
the two groups. Each participant in isolation used pen and paper tasks that consisted 
of a set of matrices in which they could allocate monetary rewards to either the 
ingroup or the outgroup, and in some cases, a proportion between both.  
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The results of the study indicated that the process of social categorization was 
adequate in producing discriminatory behaviour targeted towards the outgroup and a 
tendency to favour the ingroup. Tajfel (1970) originally postulated that ingroup bias 
emerges due to individuals having learnt, through social interaction, to favour the 
ingroup. When confronted with a novel group situation, individuals will then transfer 
this norm of ingroup favouritism into the new group. Thus, this hypothesis implies a 
generic and persistent norm of ingroup favouritism, a kind of innate psychological 
mechanism that is initiated with the most minimal suggestion of group belonging 
(Iacoviello & Spears, 2018). This hypothesis was later abandoned by Tajfel and 
replaced by the social identity theory which explained the emergence of ingroup 
favouritism being driven by a need for a positive self-concept derived from belonging 
to a group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).   
Research conducted by Iacoviello and Spears (2018), aimed to revisit Henry Tajfel’s 
generic norm hypothesis by designing a study that investigated ingroup favouritism 
as a result of participants relying on a pre-existing norm of favouring the ingroup 
when faced with a novel and uncertain group, as well as a group in a naturalistic 
setting.  
The research was split into two separate studies, the first study was focussed on 
assessing attitudes and perceptions towards ingroup favouritism in a natural group. 
The second study had the same aim of assessing attitudes and perceptions but also 
assessed allocation behaviour within the minimal group paradigm.  
In study one, Participants were required to answer test items that used national 
political groups as the group to which participants may identify with. A measure of 
attitudes towards ingroup favouritism and the participants perceptions of norms that 
related to favouring the ingroup were obtained using tests within the self-
presentation paradigm. This is an attitude scale that firstly measures participants 
attitudes toward ingroup favouritism, and secondly measures how the norm of 
ingroup favouritism was perceived. In order to determine how participants perceive a 
norm, a series of test questions were given where they had to respond to all the 
items under three different conditions. The first condition required that participants 
answer all test items as they are. In the second condition, participants were given the 
instruction to answer all items in a manner that a reader would positively regard them 
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(self-enhancement). The third condition required participants to answer all items in a 
manner that a reader would negatively regard them (self-depreciation). This method 
allows researchers to distinguish whether a norm is promoted externally, if the self-
enhancement scores are higher, or promoted internally, if the self-depreciation 
scores are higher.  
The results of this first study indicate that participants perceive the generic ingroup 
norm as one that would promote ingroup favouritism (Iacoviello & Spears, 2018). 
This suggests that participants have a default norm, learnt through prior interaction, 
that prescribes ingroup favouritism in a new and uncertain group situation.  
The second study used a minimal group setting and assessed allocation behaviour 
as well as attitudes. Allocation matrices were used to assess allocation behaviour 
within groups and between groups.  
Each participant was given a set of six matrices in three conditions in which they 
could choose how to divide points between the ingroup and the outgroup. In the first 
condition, participants were requested to allocate points as they wished. The second 
condition requested participants to allocate points under self-enhancement 
instructions, and the third condition requested participants to allocate points under 
self-depreciation instructions (Iacoviello & Spears, 2018).   
The results of this second study indicate that individuals perceive ingroup favouritism 
to be the appropriate strategy when dividing points between the ingroup and the 
outgroup. This finding was true of both the perceptions towards the ingroup norm as 
well as biased allocation behaviour that benefitted the ingroup.  
In conclusion, a wealth of research demonstrates that ingroup favouritism has been 
found to be a robust phenomenon in social exchange when individuals are aware of 
their group membership. It has been argued by (Tajfel, 1970) that individuals have 
learnt through prior interaction in group settings that ingroup favouritism is the 
expected strategy, and thus a generic norm in which individuals infer onto new and 
uncertain groups. This theory has found support through recent research (Iacoviello 






Proximity can be simply defined as the geographical distance between two or more 
individuals. There exists empirical evidence to support the theory that the closer 
players are to each other, the more favourably they are expected to act towards 
each other. 
The study conducted by Huang, Shen, and Contractor (2013), is current research 
that aimed to assess the effects of spatial proximity, temporal proximity and 
homophily on collaborations with other players within a large online gaming network. 
The online game the researchers chose to focus their study on is EverQuest II. This 
is a large online gaming network with a population exceeding one hundred thousand 
players. EverQuest II is set up under a network of smaller servers that each host a 
population of players. Movement of individuals between servers is discouraged by 
implementing a financial fee. This results in fairly stable populations under each 
server. The described study selected a single server named GUK as a sample for 
the study.  
EverQuest II allows players to select groups and work collectively in order to achieve 
game objectives. In addition to this, the game allows players to partner with one 
other player to form a dyad in which they earn points in the game. The dependent 
variable in this study is the formation of a dyadic partnership with the criteria of two 
or more game objectives being achieved in the partnership.  
Players, when registering their memberships, are requested to give certain 
demographic data such as their address, zip code, gender and age. The 
independent variable geographic proximity, is calculated from the zip codes and 
were categorized as either being of the same zip code, short distance (less than 
50km), medium distance (50-800km) or long distance (more than 800km). 
The results indicate that geographic distance between players has a large and 
positive impact on forming collaborative ties with other players. Players within close 
physical proximity to each other had a significantly higher chance of forming 
partnerships than with those that were further away. An odds ratio shows that 
players that were within the same zip code of each other were 721 times more likely 
to enter into partnerships than those that were more than 50km apart. Players within 
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50km of each other were 21.5 times more likely to enter into partnerships than with 
those that were more than 50km apart. The relationship between partnership 
formation and proximity did not have a linear decline with a decrease in proximity. 
The medium distance of 50-800km had only 20% more impact on collaboration than 
the long-distance category of more than 800km.  
This study has been beneficial in demonstrating that geographic proximity has a 
powerful effect on collaboration with others. The emergence of cooperation in this 
study is expected to have arisen due to the potential for face to face interaction 
between players within the same city (Huang et al., 2013). With an increase in 
proximity, the challenges for face to face interaction grew dramatically.  
Huang et al. (2013), operationalised proximity as geographical or spatial distance. 
This could be thought of as the most basic understanding of proximity in a social 
setting (Kiesler & Cummings, 2002).  
It is assumed that the closer players are to each other, the more favourably they are 
expected to act towards each other. The advent of effective telecommunications and 
virtual environments has, however, forced a shift in the traditional conception of 
proximity in social functioning. The paradox of being physically distant from others 
but “feeling close” has become important to investigate, as the traditional importance 
of spatial distance has become less important with new technologies. Recent 
discussion around the issue of proximity and social exchange has highlighted the 
requirement to account for perceived proximity (Wilson, Boyer O'Leary, Metiu, & Jett, 
2008).  
As Wilson et al. (2008) argues, there are two core features that mediate the effect of 
perceived proximity. The first of these being communication; the intensity, depth, 
frequency and personal relatedness of the communication can all lead to increased 
perceived proximity. The second element that is important is identification. Wilson et 
al. (2008) uses identification to describe individuals identifying with shared traits that 
foster an increase in perceived proximity. For example, two females in an office of 
males may identify with each other’s femininity and ‘feel closer’ to each other. This 
process is fundamentally a social categorisation whereby individuals identify with an 




Exploring the idea of perceived proximity is however outside of the scope of the 
current study, and due to the fact that focus is kept to the interaction between 




Self-interest can be defined as an action that only benefits the person involved. An 
easy example would be an individual that steals from the cash register, the action is 
goal oriented in that it will have a financial reward and it only benefits the thief. If the 
intention is to benefit more than the original actor, one could question if the action is 
purely self-centred or whether it has been influenced by other factors (Cropanzano, 
Goldman, & Folger, 2005).   
Self-interest can also be thought of as rationality whereby individuals make the most 
rational, profit maximising decision available to them. Rationality has often been 
assumed by economists as the dominant rule of exchange. The term homo-
economicus has been used to describe the type of person that would seek to 
increase their particular utility at the expense of others (Yamagishi, Li, Takagishi, 
Matsumoto, & Kiyonari, 2014).  
Yamagishi et al. (2014) sought to identify individuals that met the behavioural traits 
of homo-economicus using the prisoner’s dilemma game as well as the dictator 
game. The games were played on computers and each participant was assured of 
anonymity. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the participant was given a certain 
amount of money and they were tasked with the choice of whether to keep the entire 
endowment or to give it to their partner. This type of prisoner’s dilemma game is 
known as a binary prisoner’s dilemma. Participants were randomly assigned after 
each trial and each participant played three trials of the game. Participants had to 
decide whether they would give away their money or keep it based on the 
assumption that the first player had chosen to cooperate or defect. In order to 
accurately define participants with the behaviour of homo-economicus, the 
researchers used the choices that participants made when they assumed that the 
partners had cooperated. It is argued that strong motivations for reciprocation would 
be evident in the situation, but it is further argued that someone who fits the profile of 
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homo-economicus would not be affected by the motivation to reciprocate. An 
individual that is purely driven by self-interest would show no concern for fairness 
norms. The results of this experiment suggested that only a few participants kept 
their entire endowments. Only 16 percent of people kept their endowments 
consistently without sharing. 
The next game used in the research was the dictator game. Participants all played a 
one-shot dictator game, and then for the second trial, half of them were randomly 
assigned to recipients. The participants playing the role of dictator were allowed to 
choose between eleven amounts varying between zero and 1000 Yen and were then 
tasked to give their chosen amount to their partner. All participants were then asked 
to play six more games and they were assigned a different partner for each round.  
In these six rounds, participants chose a portion of the entire endowment to give. 
The portions were precalculated and ranged from 0-100% in ten percent increments. 
The results of this game showed that 15% of participants kept the entire endowment 
consistently. 
The result of this research showed that seven percent of participants, that is 31 out 
of 446, accurately fit the description of homo-economicus. These participants 
consistently acted in a way that maximised their own economic profit at the detriment 
of others. These participants acted consistently in both the prisoner’s dilemma and 
the dictator game.  While this research does not show a large portion of people that 
act in a purely self-centred manner, it does indicate that some people naturally 
pursue self-centred outcomes. The research did however highlight 28% of 
participants who consistently cooperated and gave an average of 50% of their initial 
amounts (Yamagishi et al., 2014). 
The research led by Yamagishi et al. (2014), sought to identify people that fitted the 
homo-economicus psychological profile. The term homo-economicus has often been 
used in a derogatory manner towards classical economists and has not been taken 
seriously by social researchers. While very few people fit the profile of homo-
economicus, one cannot deny their existence. 
Critique of the study would include the fact that fairness and self-interest were 
studied in isolation. Self-interest can be an ideological trait of an individual but it can 
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also be argued to be norm-induced behaviour, and this means that it can be 
strengthened or diminished in particular interactive contexts.  
The case for self-interest as a norm is also warranted, as argued by Miller (2001).  
Individuals may pursue self-interest when others around them begin acting in a self-
centred manner. Miller (2001) argues that people in a competitive situation may 
easily begin to act selfishly in fear that they may be exploited by others. The 
consequences of this is that evidence of self-interest behaviour in experiments can 
often be confused with motive. A focus of norms emerging through interaction could 




Fairness can be thought of as behaviour that is non-discriminatory and in opposition 
to self-interest. The particular type of fairness that is of focus in the current study can 
be accurately thought of as inequity aversion. Inequity aversion, as described by 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), as well as Fehr and Schmidt (1999), can be thought of 
as players seeking equitable outcomes by showing kind acts towards agents that are 
poor. It is kindness towards the ‘underdog’ as opposed to a purely self-interest-
based motivation behind giving that is of interest. This form of fairness is 
predominant when agents are desiring equitable outcomes.  
Fairness thought of as inequity aversion can be distinguished from reciprocity in that 
it is outcome orientated and is solely focussed on the wealth of each agent and the 
maintenance of equitable outcomes (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). Reciprocity, on the 
other hand, is more focussed on evaluating an action in isolation and rewarding or 
punishing that particular action based on its outcome and motives (Falk & 
Fischbacher, 2006). 
The study led by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), had the sole aim of modelling fairness as 
inequity aversion in order to explore and hopefully explain the sometimes-confusing 
behaviour in social exchange that goes against the standard self-interest model. As 
argued by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the definition of an agent who is inequity-averse 
is an individual who dislikes inequitable outcomes. The consequence of this 
definition is that the question is raised of how individuals judge outcomes as 
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equitable or inequitable. It has been argued that relative payoffs and the social 
comparison processes of individuals comparing their payoffs to others is important in 
judging the equality or lack thereof (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999).  
The model developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), assumes the reference group 
upon which participants make social comparisons to be the other players in the 
experiment, and the equitable outcome to be determined by the pecuniary outcome 
of other agents.  
In the model, it was assumed that some participants were purely selfish and others 
displayed aversion to inequitable outcomes. Players were assumed to feel inequity if 
they were both worse off in monetary terms, as well as if they were better off than 
other players. Players were also assumed to be more affected by inequity if they 
were worse off than other players than if they were better off. Utility loss is measured 
in either the occurrence of advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. An 
individual will suffer more or lose more utility when the particular inequality is 
disadvantageous.  
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) applied their model successfully to the ultimatum game and 
the market game; these will be discussed below.  
The ultimatum game is a simple game where two players, a proposer and a 
responder, are required to split a payoff. The proposer is endowed with an amount of 
money and is required to split the amount with the responder. The proposer can 
suggest any split to the responder. The responder then has two available strategies; 
to accept or to reject the offer. If the responder accepts, the split is then performed 
as originally proposed, however, if the responder chooses to reject, then both 
proposer and responder receive zero. The ultimatum game has been demonstrated 
in many experimental settings and robust facts have emerged from these studies 
(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). There are rarely proposer offers over 50% and equally rare 
are any offers below 20% with the majority of offers falling in the 40-50% range (Fehr 
& Schmidt, 1999). This means that proposers are mostly operating fairly. While 
proposers do seek profit maximisation, they are constrained by the responder’s 
ability to reject the offer which would lead to a loss from both parties.  
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The market game with competition allows a similar format to the ultimatum game, in 
that there is a single proposer, yet it differs in that there is more than one responder. 
The responders are in a competitive setting. This is a simple game that works as 
follows; a proposer will make an offer, and the responders will be faced with a choice 
of whether or not to accept the offer. If all responders reject the offer, they will all 
receive nothing. If a few responders accept the offer, a random draw will select one 
of the accepting responders to receive the payoff. The major finding under these 
conditions are that responders will accept very low offers, far lower than has been 
demonstrated by the ultimatum game. Inequality is assumed in this game, and as a 
consequence, participants have a great motivation to compete for any available 
resources. Inequity adverse participants are likely to attempt to grab anything 
available and turn the inequality into an advantageous form for themselves (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). This finding demonstrates that competition quickly becomes 
dominant over any fairness norms if there is no way of punishing the wealthy 
proposer.  
The research conducted by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has been valuable in 
explaining the evidence that is often in disagreement with the standard self-interest 
model. The research has demonstrated that fairness and cooperation are evident in 
the ultimatum game and that the inequity averse model better predicts behaviour 
than self-interest. It has also been demonstrated that although fairness norms exist, 
they are relatively weak when competition is included in the design. As demonstrated 
in the market game, a single player is unable to enforce equitable outcomes (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999).   
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) laid an important foundation of fairness being a contributing 
factor in the decision making of people allocating resources to others. Inequity 
aversion has been highlighted as the mechanism behind behaviour that contradicts 
the assumed self-interest model. 
In line with the hypothesis of people supporting the underdog, recent research by 
Schwaninger, Neuhofer, and Kittel (2018) aimed to investigate other-regarding 
behaviour in exchange networks with disadvantaged individuals.  
Most research aimed at negotiated exchange have used dyadic networks that were 
unable to assess how individual social value orientation would affect giving 
28 
 
behaviour to an individual with less structural power i.e. the underdog. The research 
by Schwaninger et al. (2018) sought to expand on the usual dyadic exchange 
experiments by adding a third member that had limited structural power in the 
negotiation.  
Two network conditions were used; the first being a triangular three node network 
which allowed equal communication between nodes, the second being a three-line 
network which allowed a central node to be connected to both nodes, who in turn 
were not connected to each other. These two different networks introduced different 
power structures. In the triangular network, power remained equal among nodes. 
The three-line network, however, introduced a strong power structure with the central 
node having a distinct structural advantage over the other nodes.  
Two further conditions were introduced which were inclusive treatment and exclusive 
treatment. Inclusive treatment allowed the third member, the ability to receive a 
portion of the payoff but was unable to enter into the negotiation. The exclusive 
treatment did not afford the third member the ability to receive a portion of the payoff.  
The inclusive network created an outlier and a potential underdog, as negotiations 
could only occur between two individuals at a time. This condition then provided the 
ability to measure fairness as the dyad that entered into negotiation had no 
obligation to offer any of the payoff to the third member.  
The experiment began with the measurement of the social value orientations for 
each participant. Social value orientation refers to an individual’s propensity towards 
being self-interested (proself) or equitable (prosocial) (Schwaninger et al., 2018).The 
rest of the experiment was laboratory based with all exchanges and communication 
being conducted though a computer interface. A series of exchanges were made 
under all conditions with a computerised random assignment of participants across 
conditions.  
In the inclusive treatment, a dyad decided on an outcome for all three members in 
the network. In the triangle condition, agreeing pairs kept an average of 11 points 
each for themselves. The portion of payoff to the third member is of theoretical 
interest to the study and was classified into three cases of social value orientations 
of the agreeing pairs. The first combination were two individuals that were prosocial, 
this pair gave an average of 4 points to the third member. The second combination 
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included one prosocial and the other being proself, this combination gave an 
average of 2 points to the third member. The third combination were two individuals 
that were proself, this pair gave an average of 1.1 points to the third member. 
The main finding of the study was that on average, dyads that agreed on 
distributions gave an average of ten percent to the excluded third member. It has 
been demonstrated that individual social value orientations play a role in the fairness 
of distributions of resources in an exchange network. These results show conclusive 
instances of inequity aversion in contradiction to the expected finding of no payoffs 
under the general assumption of self-interest (Schwaninger et al., 2018).  
 
Studying multilevel-emergence in the social sciences 
 
Thus far, the review has covered social exchange theory and its potential for 
explaining exchange behaviour. The particular gaps in the literature were then 
covered with specific focus on exchange rules. Following that, recent empirical 
support for the set of proposed exchange rules have been discussed. The following 
section has been devoted to the methodological difficulties in studying exchange 
behaviour and the macrosocial phenomena that emerge through interaction. Agent-
based modelling is argued to be a highly effective research tool that will allow the 
direct study of the exchange process from microsocial exchange between individuals 
to the resulting emergent phenomena that results from repeated interaction.  
Traditional social psychological research often focuses on macrosocial norms and 
systems that shape individual behaviour from the top down (Macy & Willer, 2002). 
There is great merit in this research as it has provided a theoretical base for many 
phenomena. A good example of top down research would be an experimental setting 
where a researcher measures the effect of an experimental condition on the 
individual participants. In this case, the emerged construct is measured, however the 
dynamic process by which it emerged is not assessed. 
Studying emergence from the bottom up has been studied in qualitative research, 
but until now has been difficult to study in quantitative research designs. This is due 
mainly to the lack of suitable research methods that are capable of directly studying 
emergence as a dynamic, temporal process (Kozlowski, Chao, Grand, Braun, & 
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Kuljanin, 2013). With the use of agent based computational models, researchers are 
able to endow virtual agents with a set of simple rules that will facilitate the 
simulation of complex social systems. The ability to demonstrate that a certain rule 
or combination of rules leads to emergent phenomena is the core objective of bottom 
up research using an agent-based model (Kozlowski et al., 2013). This bottom up 
approach allows researchers not only to measure the emerged construct, but also to 
focus specifically on the process and mechanisms of the emerging construct 
(Kozlowski et al., 2013). 
The following section has been devoted to describing agent-based modelling with 
examples of agent-based modelling being provided relating to their value as a 
research method for testing theory. 
 
Agent based simulations 
 
Agent based models are basic simulations of social interaction run through a 
computer interface. Agent based models are not confined to social life, they have 
been used to model traffic flow in cities (Chen & Zhan, 2008), pedestrian movements 
(Kerridge, Hine, & Wigan, 2001), avian flock patterns (Reynolds, 1987) and cell 
behaviour (Pogson, Smallwood, Qwarnstrom, & Holcombe, 2006) as a few 
examples. An agent-based model uses precise mathematical rules that guide an 
agent’s interaction with other agents. Due to the fact that there are none of the usual 
constraints attributed to sampling human participants, researchers are able to run an 
infinite number of replications with varying rules. Researchers can also include as 
many agents as they wish. The only constraint is the computing power available to 
the researcher.  
Applications such as Netlogo have simplified the task of building agent-based 
models which has, in turn, opened up the research method to many researchers. 
The first step in building a model is to develop rules that the agents will use in their 
interaction. The most commonly supported stance with developing rules is to keep it 
as simple as possible. The phrase “keep it simple, stupid” is often referenced when 
deciding on model parameters. The basic idea is to use as few simple rules as 
possible, and to slowly add rules or adapt them to create the emergent phenomenon. 
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The most obvious benefit to keeping it as simple as possible is that it reduces the 
complexity in developing the model. More importantly though, complex macrosocial 
phenomena do not necessarily stem from complex cognition in individuals. As 
argued by Macy and Willer (2002), humans follow simple heuristics, norms, social 
habits and moral codes. These, in a sense, are simple rules that often lead to highly 
complex emergent patterns in real life.  
In order to accurately simulate an emerged phenomenon, it is important to be sure 
that chosen rules are sufficient to produce the outcome that is observed empirically. 
Epstein (1999) discussed the issue of generative sufficiency where a set of rules 
need to be sufficient in reproducing the macrophenomenon even if replicated a 
number of times. Attention need also be focussed to the fact that even if a rule or a 
particular combination of rules leads to the emergence of an observed phenomenon 
equivalent to what is empirically observed, it does not necessarily mean that these 
are the rules that are at play. They are simply candidates which require further 
investigation. The method of comparing the generated macro-structure to that of 
human data with the use of inferential statistics proves generative sufficiency of the 
rules underlying the agent-based model (Epstein, 1999). 
A illustrative example of a study that used simple rules to generate an emergent 
phenomenon was the study led by Reynolds (1987) that aimed to replicate the 
flocking behaviour of birds in flight. The three rules used to direct the autonomous 
agents were simple:  
• Agents should not occupy the same space as another agent or foreign object. 
This was to avoid collisions with other agents.  
• Agents should move at the same speed as each other as well as travel in the 
same direction. 
• Agents should be cohesive and attempt to remain close while not intruding on 
the personal space of other agents. Each agent would desire to be centred, 
yet is constrained by the rule of collision avoidance.  
Agents where then placed across a grid. Immediately, agents followed the centring 
rule and all converged to one area. The group avoided collisions with each other so 
all agents occupied their own space with relatively even spaces around each agent. 
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The group quickly became polarized following the same direction and speed as each 
other (Reynolds, 1987).  
This study is a powerful example of how agent-based modelling can uncover the 
simple rules that lead to emergent phenomenon. An important demonstration is that 
agents are modelled as autonomous beings that do not rely on a centralised 
authority to guide interaction. As Macy and Willer (2002) have clearly pointed out, 
neither the flock nor individual birds were modelled, the focus was to model their 
interaction with each other.  
It is important to note however, that just because a set of rules have led to a 
particular emerged phenomenon, does not mean that there are no other rules or 
explanations for the emergence. The decision of which particular parameters (rules) 
that need to be manipulated should be driven by theory. Agent based modelling is a 
powerful tool for exploring microsocial interactions and their resulting emerged 
phenomena, but without theoretical grounding, the results would be meaningless. In 
order to maintain a culture of good science, researchers must use theoretical and 
empirically proven parameters (Macy & Willer, 2002).  
Using theory driven parameters in an agent-based model affords researchers with 
another powerful advantage, and that is the ability to test theoretical assumptions 
behind emergence. A good example of modelling being used to test theory is the 
early study on attractiveness and couple formation by Kalick and Hamilton (1986).  
It was long theorised that potential mates were chosen based on how well they 
matched their own attractiveness level, this was known as the matching hypothesis 
(Kalick & Hamilton, 1986). Evidence in studies that focussed on this area soon failed 
to support this view, and it was argued that people tend to choose the most attractive 
partner possible (Walster, 1970; Walster, Aronson, Abrahams, & Rottman, 1966).  
Kalick and Hamilton (1986) devised an agent-based model in order to study the 
agent level goals of couple formation. A simple model was created where three 
simulations were run testing the two argued mechanisms for mate selection. In the 
first simulation, the rule was set for agents to select partners based on the highest 
possible attractiveness score. The second simulation used a rule where agents 
would choose the best matching partner to their own attractiveness score and the 
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third simulation relied on a combination of matching and finding the most attractive 
mate.       
The model was a simple rule-based procedure and is detailed below. Two thousand 
agents were created with 1000 being male and 1000 being female. Each agent was 
then assigned an attractiveness score ranging between 1 and 10. Both attributes of 
gender and attractiveness were permanently affixed to each agent for the duration of 
the simulation. Agents were then randomly paired for a date and they were then 
faced with a decision of whether to accept or reject their partner. The decision was 
made based on the attractiveness of the partner in relation to the agents own 
attractiveness. In order for the couple to be successful, both agents had to make the 
decision to accept their partner. Once a successful couple had been formed, they 
were removed from the dating pool. 
The results showed that when agents were given the rule of finding the most 
attractive partner, an intercouple correlation of .55 was found which matches what 
has been empirically observed. The simulations that included matching combined 
with an attractiveness rule had correlations that exceeded what has been empirically 
observed (Kalick & Hamilton, 1986). An explanation for this is that highly attractive 
couples tend to form early in the experiment and are then removed from the dating 
pool. With an increase in time, the attractiveness of the remaining agents drops 
along with the attractiveness of the resulting couples (Smith & Conrey, 2007). The 
authors argue that the results must be cautiously interpreted as measurement error 
in past empirical research was evident whereas in the models, this factor was 
absent. In addition to this, the simulation with the rule of seeking the most attractive 
partner led to an increase in intracouple correlation over time. Kalick and Hamilton 
(1986) argue that this trend supports findings that casual couples are weakly 
correlated in this regard, with more serious couples being more highly correlated. 
The results of this simulation suggest that attractiveness seeking is more important 
than the favoured matching hypothesis (Kalick & Hamilton, 1986) 
The use of agent-based modelling for simulating macrosocial structures from agent 
level interaction is well demonstrated, yet the process of comparing these 
simulations to real life data has yet to be done effectively. Typically, agent-based 
models have been qualitatively compared to empirical data which leaves the 
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researcher with the responsibility to ensure that simulated outcomes sufficiently 
resemble real life behaviour (Silverman, 2018). Consequently, this places great 
constraints on the usefulness of simulations to explain real life behaviour. If one’s 
wish was to specify the rules that lead to birds flocking, in a culture of good science, 
we would need to quantitatively validate the results instead of making a subjective 
judgement of whether or not the results simply look like flocking behaviour.  
In the current study, the aim has been to tease apart and study the relative 
importance of multiple exchange rules in different contexts. In order to validate the 
simulated results of this study, a quantitative metric was required. A laboratory-
based study of social exchange was used in order to quantitatively compare the 
outcomes of the simulation to actual human exchange decisions. The method of 
comparison was achieved automatically by uploading empirical data into the 
simulator with an output data file that specified the comparison between the 










Section 1: Virtual Interactive Application (VIAPPL) research design 
 
In the current study, an agent-based model was used to replicate the bottom up 
emerged behavioural patterns observed in the human VIAPPL experiments. The 
VIAPPL studies have been outlined below, following this, the agent-based model has 
been described.  
The VIAPPL study by Durrheim, Quayle, Tredoux, Titlestad, and Tooke (2016) was 
developed to study social exchange behaviour within an interacting exchange 
network over time. The study used an experimental setting where participants were 
stationed at computers with no face to face interaction. The participants were 
allocated a number of tokens at the start of the game and were instructed to allocate 
a token every round to either one of the fourteen players. The experiment was run 
over forty rounds with the recorded decision of each participant’s allocation to either 
themselves or to another specific person within the network. Figure 1 graphically 
represents the interface that participants used to interact with one another. The 
following information was available on each players screen; the players wealth, the 
wealth of each participant within the network, the accumulative wealth of each group 
and the progress of the game indicated by the round number.  
In order to test how network structure and existing norms influence exchange 
behaviour, two experimental conditions were introduced. The first condition was the 
minimal group situation which introduced visible group identity and the second 
condition was wealth inequality. These two conditions both had a corresponding 
control condition where no manipulation of group identity or inequality of wealth was 
introduced. These four conditions were fully crossed in a factorial design and four 
replications were run for each condition. Table 1 illustrates the VIAAPL design with 
the number of replications per condition. The two experimental conditions, visible 
group identity and inequality, have been described in more detail below. 
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Figure 1: The VIAPPL game depicting a token allocation 
 
Note. This figure depicts the interface from the perspective of the 6th player as denoted by the bold black outline 
of the 6th avatar. The arrow indicates the decision of the 6th player to allocate a token to the 2nd player. The 
experimental condition depicted here is an equal status group condition.  
 












The group condition was introduced by randomly assigning participants into two 
groups. Participants were not aware of the random assignment and were told that 
they were assigned to particular groups based on their choice in a categorization 
task. Participants were requested to choose between two paintings, one having been 
painted by Klee and the other by Kandinsky, and were placed into the respective 
groups. The participants were aware of their group membership by the colour of their 
avatar on the play screen. A set of experiments were also run with an individual 
condition in which players were not aware of their group membership. In the 
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individual condition, participants were not aware of their group membership as all 14 
players had the same colour avatars.  
An inequality condition was introduced where participants were given unequal 
starting token balances. In the group and individual conditions under inequality, there 
existed a high and low status group with one of the groups having been allocated 30 
tokens while the other was given 10. In the group and individual conditions under 
equality, each participant was allocated 20 tokens.  
These two conditions were introduced in order to study the effects that different 
contexts have on exchange behaviour. The data from these human games were 
collected in 2014 by the Department of Psychology on the University of KwaZulu-
Natal Pietermaritzburg campus.   
 
Section 2: Game simulator 
 
An agent-based model was developed to uncover the agent level decision making 
that led to the emerged results obtained in the VIAPPL data. 
The simulator used in this research has been programmed in Netlogo (Wilensky, 
1999). Netlogo is a popular interface used for modelling complex interaction over 
time (Tisue & Wilensky, 2004). It is praised for its simplicity which affords beginning 
modellers the ability to program simple models in order to research human 
behaviour. Netlogo was chosen for the fact that it was a simple environment in which 
to program the simulation and that it is able to accept data input in the form of a .csv 
file.  
The simulator is designed in such a way that it is fed with a single row of data at a 
time, sequencing throughout the entire game. The simulator reads a row of data, 
representing the starting conditions for round 1. It then simulates play based on the 
starting conditions and the game rules defined by the sliders. It then reads the 
starting conditions for round 2 of the human game and continues this process until it 
reaches 40 rounds. A data file is automatically created in the beginning of the 
simulation with the data from each round written as the simulator progresses 
throughout the 40 rounds. Each row of data details the results of the simulated round 
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alongside a comparison with the human round. It was then possible to compare the 
outcomes of human and simulated play after each round. Figure 2 graphically 
represents the comparison process between the human games and the simulated 
output.  
Figure 2: Simulator comparison procedure 
 
 
The simulator, like the human game, is set up with fourteen virtual agents and is 
graphically represented in a circular format (See the comparison between the 
VIAPPL game (Figure 1) and the game simulator (Figure 3)). The representation will 
change based on whether the simulation includes a group condition or individual 
condition. In the group condition, agents have been coloured blue and white in an 
alternate order. In the individual condition, all agents are coloured white. Token 
allocations are represented graphically as arrows between agents and as a circle in 
the event of self-allocation.  
The independent variables namely, vicinity, fairness, reciprocity, self-interest, 
random and ingroup favouritism are manipulated using a set of sliders that range 
Agent-based model 
predicts round 1 moves 
A Scaled Prediction 
Likelihood is created that 
specifies how close the 
model predicted human 
moves 
Empathy scores for each 
agent ranked from 1-14 
and entered into each 
column of the Empathy 
Matrix 
Data from round 1 written 
in comparison data file 
Round 2 human data read 
from data file 
Round 1 human data read 
from data file 
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from zero to one hundred. Using one particular combination of the six independent 
variables will result in one game of forty rounds. The simulator has also been 
programmed to be able to run multiple combinations of the independent variables in 
one simulation. This is executed by setting a range for each variable between zero 
and one hundred and then specifying the increments to which each variable should 





Figure 3: Screenshot of the game simulator 
 
The token exchanges are depicted as the red lines between human figures, an arrow gives indication of the direction of giving. The circles represent instances of self-giving. 
The numbers next to the agents represent the wealth in the number of available tokens for each corresponding agent. To the left of the image, a set of sliders are designed to 
set the weightings for each factor. These sliders are automatically controlled when the range sliders (to the right of the image) are used. The ‘Range of weights’ function sets 
the minimum weighting for each factor as well as the maximum weight. The increment sliders control the increments of increase in weightings for each round. The simulation 
as depicted here is set up to simulate every combination of all 6 factors at 3 levels of 0, 50 and 100.
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Model of social exchange 
 
In the development of the agent-based model, it was necessary to formulate a 
mathematical model in order to model exchange in the VIAPPL setting. The model 
was developed in a collaboration with the school of psychology and the school of 
mathematics, statistics and computer science of the University of Kwazulu-Natal 
(Durrheim et al., 2013). 
In order to model exchange behaviour, a single matrix for each modelled behavioural 
construct was used. These matrices were summed to form a final matrix termed the 
Empathy Matrix. The Empathy Matrix was a 14 x 14 matrix that represented the 
computed likelihood that each agent would give their token to each of the 14 agents 
in the game. The simulator depicted in Figure 3 used the highest likelihood to make 
the eventual allocation decision. It was necessary to calculate wealth in each round 
and the change in wealth at the end of each round, two vectors were used to 
accomplish this. The notation and vectors have been described below, following that, 
the matrix calculations have been explained (unless stated otherwise, all matrix 
calculations have been demonstrated with 𝑁𝑁 = 4).  
 
The participants modelled as agents are labelled  𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2,𝑝𝑝3,𝑝𝑝4 … … , 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁. In the 
current study, both the human games and simulations: 𝑁𝑁 = 14. 
The wealth of the participants in the beginning of each round (𝑟𝑟) is defined by the 
vector; 
𝑊𝑊(𝑟𝑟) ≔ {𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2,𝑤𝑤3,𝑤𝑤4, … … … ,𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁} 
Where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖  is the wealth of participant 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  for  𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1 −𝑁𝑁]. 
 
A vector to calculate the change in the wealth of each participant is defined as;  
𝐶𝐶(𝑟𝑟) ≔ {𝑐𝑐1, 𝑐𝑐2, 𝑐𝑐3, 𝑐𝑐4, … … … , 𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁} 
Where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  is the change in wealth of participant 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  for  𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1 − 𝑁𝑁]. 
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Each change in wealth, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 can be a value in the range -1 (in the case that participant 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  gave his token away and received no token) and 𝑁𝑁 − 1 (in the case that there 
was self-giving as well as every other participant allocating their token to participant 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖). One exception is the situation where a player has spent all their tokens and so 
has none to give away. In this case, the numeral would be set to zero. In the case 
where 𝑁𝑁 = 4, we could assume an example where, 𝑊𝑊(5) ≔ {10, 16, 0,14}. If 𝑝𝑝1 gave 
their token to 𝑝𝑝3, 𝑝𝑝2 gave to 𝑝𝑝1, 𝑝𝑝4 gave to 𝑝𝑝3 and 𝑝𝑝3 self-gave; the change 
vector for the end of round 6 would be 𝐶𝐶(6) ≔ {0,−1, 2,−1}. The wealth vector for 
beginning of the next round would then change to 𝑊𝑊(7) ≔ {10, 15, 2,13}.  
 
Empathy Matrix  
 
The Empathy Matrix developed by Durrheim et al. (2013) is a tool for summarizing 
the decision rules that form the behaviour of the simulated agents. The matrix, in an 
𝑁𝑁 ×  𝑁𝑁  form, determines the likelihood that each participant would receive a token 
from every participant, including themselves (in the main diagonal) in each round. 
The Empathy Matrix is formulated by the matrix sum of six different matrices, namely 
the Fairness Matrix, Reciprocity Matrix, Ingroup favouritism Matrix, Self-interest 
Matrix, Vicinity Matrix and Random Matrix. Each of these matrices represent an 
exchange rule. 
• The Fairness Matrix allows the operationalisation of the exchange rule to 
allocate a token to the poorest participant. 
• The Reciprocity Matrix allows the operationalisation of the exchange rule to 
reciprocate a token that was given in the previous round. 
• The Ingroup favouritism Matrix allows the operationalisation of the exchange 
rule to give a token to favour the ingroup. 
• The Self-interest Matrix allows the operationalisation of the exchange rule to 
give a token to oneself. 
• The Vicinity Matrix allows the operationalisation of the exchange rule to 
favour one’s neighbours when deciding on who to give a token to. 
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• The Random Matrix allows the operationalisation of uncertainty in human 
decision making. 
Each of these matrices have 𝑁𝑁 rows and 𝑁𝑁 columns, where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of 
participants. In the Empathy Matrix, the columns specify the givers while the rows 
specify the receivers. Thus, for each particular column, there are 𝑁𝑁 possible 
receivers (the giver inclusive) if self-giving is allowed; otherwise there are 𝑁𝑁 − 1 
possible receivers (i.e. excluding the giver). Each time a token is given, a possible 
receiver with the largest value in a column will receive the token.  Each participant 
gives a token per round to either themselves or to another participant. The Empathy 
Matrix is recalculated at the beginning of each round.  
In order to illustrate the mechanics of the Empathy Matrix, a simple example is given 
below;  
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟) = � 𝐸𝐸1,1 𝐸𝐸1,2 … 𝐸𝐸1,14𝐸𝐸2,1 𝐸𝐸2,2 … 𝐸𝐸2,14… … … …
𝐸𝐸14,1 𝐸𝐸14,2 … 𝐸𝐸14,14� 
  
In the example matrix 𝐸𝐸, each entry, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗, is a value that acts as an intercept 
between a giver and receiver. A givers perspective would be a particular column with 
𝑁𝑁 rows. If the entry, say 𝐸𝐸1,2, were the highest value in column 2, this would mean 
that 𝑝𝑝2 would desire to allocate a token to 𝑝𝑝1. Likewise, If the entry, 𝐸𝐸14,3, were the 
highest value in column 3, then 𝑝𝑝3 would desire to allocate a token to 𝑝𝑝14. 
Fairness Matrix 
 
The Fairness Matrix allows the operationalisation of the decision to allocate a token 
to the poorest participant. The Fairness Matrix is calculated by ranking the 
participants according to their wealth. A fairness value, say 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,  is assigned to each 
participant from the poorest to the richest. The value of 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  must be in the range zero 
44 
 
and one (i.e. 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  ∈ [0, 1].). The ranking allows the poorest players to be favoured 
to receive a token. These fairness values are then entered into the matrix with the 
assumption that all participants will give the same value to each participant in the 
game.  
The Fairness Matrix is calculated as follows: Rank the participants based on their 
wealth. A participant with the highest number of tokens is ranked the highest 𝑟𝑟ℎ while 
a participant with the least number of tokens is ranked the lowest 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 . The highest 
rank is 1 while the lowest possible rank is 𝑁𝑁. If there are one or more ties in the 
ranking, then  𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 ≤  𝑁𝑁. 
Calculate each 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  using the formula 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗/ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 . Note that 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖0 =  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖1 = ⋯ = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖     ∀ 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1, … ,𝑁𝑁} 
If 𝑁𝑁 = 4, and we consider the wealth vector used above, 𝑊𝑊(5) ≔ {10, 16, 0,14}, 
the matrix values would then be entered as follows:  
 
𝐹𝐹(5) =  �3 3 3 31 1 1 14 4 4 42 2 2 2� 
 
 
If there is a tie in the number of tokens that two or more players have, they would be 
assigned the same fairness value and the values would decrease normally. If the 
participants were ranked according to the wealth vector of round 5, (𝑊𝑊(5) ≔{10, 8, 8,14}) the Fairness Matrix values would be entered as follows; 
 
 𝐹𝐹(5) =  �2 2 2 24 4 4 44 4 4 43 3 3 3� 
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The values in the Fairness Matrix have then been normalised to range between 0 
and 1. This is achieved by dividing each value by the highest value in the particular 
column. If the wealth vector 𝑊𝑊(5) ≔ {10, 8, 8,14} is used, the matrix with 
normalised values would be entered as follows; 
 




The Reciprocity Matrix is calculated by referring back to the previous round. If 
𝑝𝑝1 were to give their token to 𝑝𝑝4 then, in the following round, it would be assumed 
that 𝑝𝑝4 would feel a desire to reciprocate. If two participants gave a token to 𝑝𝑝4 in 
the previous round, it is assumed that he/she would desire to allocate a token to 
both players. 
A reciprocity value, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, is equal to 1 if participant 𝑖𝑖 gave a token to participant 𝑗𝑗 in 
the previous round, otherwise 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗   =  0. The Reciprocity Matrix changes after each 
round. 
As an illustration, let us assume that in round 3, 𝑝𝑝4 gave their token to 𝑝𝑝2,  𝑝𝑝1 gave 
their token to 𝑝𝑝3, 𝑝𝑝2 gave their token to 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝3 gave their token to 𝑝𝑝1. In the 
following round, the values in the Reciprocity Matrix are entered as follows;  
 






Self-interest is modelled quite simply with the main diagonal having 1’s in the entries. 
The self-interest value, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,  is equal to 1 if 𝑖𝑖 =  𝑗𝑗, otherwise 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  =  0. The Self-
interest Matrix remains constant throughout the game.  
The Self-interest Matrix is illustrated below; 
 




The Vicinity Matrix has been explained based on the game situation with 𝑁𝑁 = 4. The 







A vicinity value, 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, is a reflection of the distance between two participants, 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗.  
1) For each participant, the Netlogo function is used to calculate the distance 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
between participant 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and another participant 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗, where 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 are integers 








2) The distances in (1) are used to form a distance matrix showing the distance 
from a participant (matrix column) to another participant (matrix row).  
 
Note that the distance from a participant to itself is zero. Also 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 =  𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 . In 
the given game situation of 𝑁𝑁 = 4, it should be observed that 𝑑𝑑1,2  ≅  𝑑𝑑1,4.  
Assume this value to be 1 and  𝑑𝑑1,3 = 2.  
 
 
𝑑𝑑 = �0 1 2 11 0 1 22 1 0 11 2 1 0� 
 
 
The values in the distance matrix 𝑑𝑑 are then normalised to obtain 𝑉𝑉 in the range   0 ≤  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 1 . This is done by dividing the entries in each column by the maximum 
distance, 𝑑𝑑, in that column. The value obtained is then subtracted from 1. This is 
calculated by the formula below. 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 =  1 −  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  ( 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0 ) 
 
𝑉𝑉 = � 0 0.5 0 0.50.5 0 0.5 00 0.5 0 0.50.5 0 0.5 0 � 
 
Note: If  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1.5; 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1 − �1.52 � = 0.25 which implies that the distance 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 =1 is preferred to 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1.5. In general, the farther the distance between participants, 
the less desirable it would be to allocate a token. As the vicinity between players 
never changes, the matrix remains constant throughout the game. 
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Ingroup favouritism Matrix 
 
The Ingroup favouritism Matrix has been explained in reference to the game situation 









A group value, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, is equal to 1 if participant 𝑖𝑖 is in the same group with 
participant 𝑗𝑗, otherwise 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 =  0. 
The Ingroup favouritism Matrix, as in the case with the Vicinity Matrix, remains 
constant throughout the game.  
As an illustration, the values of the group matrix for 𝑁𝑁 = 4 are entered as follows 
 
𝐺𝐺 = �1 0 1 00 1 0 11 0 1 00 1 0 1� 
Random Matrix 
 
The Random Matrix uses random entries in order to operationalise uncertainty in 
human decision making. The Random Matrix is calculated using Netlogo’s random-
float function. A random value in the range of 0 and 1 is assigned to each row in 
each column in the matrix with equal probability. The Random Matrix changes at 






As an illustration, a Random Matrix for 𝑁𝑁 = 4 is shown below; 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(4) =  �0.54 0.78 0.55 0.220.99 0.87 0.91 0.300.50 0.73 0.10 0.80.56 0.01 0.01 0.09� 
 
Computing the Empathy Matrix 
 
The sum of the six matrices above are used to create the Empathy Matrix (Durrheim 
et al., 2013). If we consider round 6 with the wealth vector of 𝑊𝑊(5) ≔{10, 16, 0,14} and when in round 5, 𝑝𝑝1 gave a token to 𝑝𝑝3, 𝑝𝑝3 gave to 𝑝𝑝2, 𝑝𝑝2 gave 
to 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝4 gave to 𝑝𝑝2. The Empathy Matrix for round 6 would be calculated as 
follows; 
 
𝐸𝐸(6) = 𝐹𝐹(6) + 𝑆𝑆 + 𝑉𝑉 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(6) + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑅𝑅(6) 
 
�
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.750.25 0.25 0.25 0.251 1 1 10.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 �  +   �
1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 1 00 0 0 1�  + �
0 0.5 0 0.50.5 0 0.5 00 0.5 0 0.50.5 0 0.5 0 �   +
 �0.54 0.78 0.55 0.220.99 0.87 0.91 0.300.50 0.73 0.10 0.80.56 0.01 0.01 0.09�  + �
1 0 1 00 1 0 11 0 1 00 1 0 1� + �
0 0 1 01 0 0 00 1 0 00 1 0 0�   
 




In this example, the agents that received tokens are indicated by the bold entries in 
the matrix. 𝑝𝑝1 self-gave, 𝑝𝑝2  gave a token to 𝑝𝑝3, 𝑝𝑝3 gave a token to 𝑝𝑝1  and 𝑝𝑝4 self-
gave. The change vector for the end of round 6 would then be 𝐶𝐶(6) ≔ {1,−1, 0,0}. 
The wealth vector for the end of round 6 (beginning of round 7) would then be 
𝑊𝑊(7) ≔ {11, 15, 0,14}. 
In addition to simply adding the six matrices together, each matrix can be weighted 
in order to increase or decrease the influence that the particular factor has on the 
Empathy Matrix. The ability to weight each factor in different combinations provides 
the ability to determine which psychological theory is most important in matching the 
modelled data to that of the human experiments.  
 
The Empathy Matrix  𝐸𝐸, is then calculated as below: 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  = 𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝑣𝑣𝑤𝑤 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 +  rd𝑤𝑤 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗   
Where: 
𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤 is the Fairness weight 
𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤 is the Reciprocity weight  
𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤 is the Ingroup Favouritism weight 
𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 is the Self-interest weight 
𝑣𝑣𝑤𝑤 is the Vicinity weight 
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤 is the Random weight
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In order to illustrate this, the example of the wealth vector for round 5, 𝑊𝑊(5) ≔{10, 16, 0,14} has been used. In round 5, 𝑝𝑝1 gave a token to 𝑝𝑝3, 𝑝𝑝3 gave to 𝑝𝑝2, 𝑝𝑝2 
gave to 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝4 gave to 𝑝𝑝2. The weights have been set as; 𝐹𝐹 = 5, 𝑆𝑆 = 5,𝑉𝑉 =5,𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 5,𝐺𝐺 = 10,𝑅𝑅 = 10. The Empathy Matrix would then be calculated as 
follows; 
 
5 × �0.75 0.75 0.75 0.750.25 0.25 0.25 0.251 1 1 10.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 �  + 5 ×   �
1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 1 00 0 0 1�  + 5 ×
�
0 0.5 0 0.50.5 0 0.5 00 0.5 0 0.50.5 0 0.5 0 � + 5 ×  �
0.54 0.78 0.55 0.220.99 0.87 0.91 0.300.50 0.73 0.10 0.80.56 0.01 0.01 0.09�  + 10 × �
1 0 1 00 1 0 11 0 1 00 1 0 1� +
10 × �0 0 1 01 0 0 00 1 0 00 1 0 0�   
        �
3.75 3.75 3.75 5.752.5 2.5 2.5 2.55 5 5 52.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 � + �
5 0 0 00 5 0 00 0 5 00 0 0 5� + �
0 2.5 0 2.52.5 0 2.5 00 2.5 0 2.52.5 0 2.5 0 � +
           � 2.7 3.9 2.75 1.14.95 4.35 4.55 1.52.5 3.65 0.5 4.82.8 0.05 0.05 0.45� + �
10 0 10 00 10 0 1010 0 10 00 10 0 10� + �
0 0 10 010 0 0 00 10 0 00 10 0 0�  
 
𝐸𝐸(6) = �𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐.𝟒𝟒𝟓𝟓 10.15 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐.𝟓𝟓 9.3519.95 21.85 9.55 1417.5 21.15 20.5 12.37.8 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐.𝟓𝟓𝟓𝟓 5.05 𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏.𝟐𝟐𝟓𝟓�  
 
 
In this example, 𝑝𝑝1  self-gave, 𝑝𝑝2   gave to 𝑝𝑝4, 𝑝𝑝3 gave to 𝑝𝑝1  and 𝑝𝑝4 self-gave. 
Reflecting back to the wealth vector for round 5, 𝑊𝑊(5) ≔ {10, 16, 0,14}, it is noted 
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that although 𝑝𝑝3 had the desire to give a token to 𝑝𝑝1  they had no available tokens 
and were unable to give the token to 𝑝𝑝1. The change vector at the end of round 6 
would be 𝐶𝐶(6) ≔ {0,−1, 0,1}. The wealth vector at the end of round 6 (the 
beginning of round 7) would be updated to 𝑊𝑊(7) ≔ {10, 15, 0,15}. 
 
Comparing fit between simulator and human play 
 
Predicted Rank (PR): 
 
The empathy scores for each agent are ranked in each column of the Empathy 
Matrix to represent the preferred order of allocating tokens. Each rank is a number in 
the range [1:𝑁𝑁] where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of participants (𝑁𝑁 = 14 in the current 
study). The number of ranks is equal to the number of unique values and will range 
between 1 and 𝑁𝑁 if all the values in the Empathy Matrix are unique. An agent ranked 
1 is preferred over all other agents. Generally, an agent ranked 𝑋𝑋 is preferred to an 
agent ranked 𝑌𝑌 (where 𝑋𝑋 <  𝑌𝑌). If there are one or more ties between agents, the 
token is given to the player with the lowest wealth. If they both have the same 
wealth, a random choice is made. 
 
As an example, the Empathy Matrix for round 6 would be ranked as follows; 
This is the Empathy Matrix before ranking.  
 






This is the same matrix ranked in order of giving preference. 
 
𝐸𝐸(6) = �1 4 1 42 2 3 23 3 2 34 1 4 1�  
 
These ranks are then compared to the exchanges that occurred in the human 
experiments and are used to calculate the scaled prediction rank. This comparison is 
made by comparing the actual allocation made by each of the human agents with the 
vector of ranks in the output column for the corresponding simulated agent. For 
example, in 𝐸𝐸(6) above, if human player 1 (represented as column 1) self-gave, the 
simulator would have predicted the outcome correctly.  
Instead of measuring fit in terms of a binary decision (accurate or inaccurate 
prediction), scaled prediction ranks were used to estimate the degree of accuracy. A 
simulated decision would obtain a higher accuracy score if the human agent 
allocated to player ranked 2 than to player ranked 14.  
 
Scaled Prediction Rank (SPR): 
 
By scaling the predicted rank, a numerical value of how close the model is to a 
correct prediction can be specified. The scaled prediction rank is a value in the range 
0 and 1 inclusive (0 <=  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 <=  1), and is calculated as follows;   
 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 =  {1 −  [ (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 −  1) / (𝑁𝑁 −  1) ] } 
 
Thus, a value of 1 implies that the agent ranked 1 actually received a token in the 
real game while a value of 0 implies that the agent that received a token was ranked 
𝑁𝑁 (the last). The closer an 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 is to 1, the better the prediction. The scaled 
prediction score for the ranks 1 to 14 are displayed in table 1 below. These vary on a 
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scale from 0 to 1 with a mean of (M = 0.5, SD = .31). An Average Scaled Prediction 
rank, calculated as 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅/𝑁𝑁, is calculated per round and specifies the prediction 
accuracy of each round.  
 



















Data from the human games were fed as a single data set into Netlogo which ran 
one row at a time through the entire game. A description of the human game has 
been given followed by a description of the procedure for each simulation. Following 
this, a description of the comparison data has been laid out.  
A total of sixteen human games were used to compare against the simulator (See 
Table 1 for a graphical representation of replications). There were four experimental 
conditions with 4 games per condition. 
Running the simulations 
 
During the setup of the particular simulation, a dataset from the VIAPPL experiments 
conducted in 2014 were selected, converted to .csv format and uploaded into 
Netlogo. Parameters were then set up to define the particular simulation and to 
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match the experimental conditions of the human game. The first step in setup is to 
define how many tokens each agent is given to start with. This was matched to the 
human game that was selected for the simulation. In the games that did not include 
an inequality condition, agents were allocated 20 tokens at the start of the game. 
When inequality was included in the human game, half of the agents were allocated 
10 tokens with the other half receiving 30 tokens.  
The second step was to define the weighting for each factor. In the current study, 
each of the six simulation factors were set to range between zero and one hundred. 
Increments of increase were set at fifty. The simulator would then run 40 rounds with 
one combination of factors and then run through every possible combination of the 
six factors with the three levels of 0, 50 and 100. The six factors with 3 levels 
resulted in 729 combinations of factor weightings. Each combination was repeated 
over 40 rounds. 
One problem encountered with the simulator set to run these combinations was that 
when all factors were set to zero, a perfect predicted score was returned. Upon 
investigation it was revealed to be a mathematical problem that prevented this 
particular combination from being used. If the six matrices were all ranked zero, (the 
coefficients all being zero) upon multiplying, the values in the matrix became zero. 
During ranking, agents were given an equal rank of 1 and this returned a perfect 
predicted rank for each agent. A simple solution was to remove the condition where 




The data produced by the simulator detailed the comparison between the selected 
human experiment and the prediction derived from the Empathy Matrix (see Table 
4). A round summary sheet was produced in excel that gave a summary of the 
predictions and comparisons for all 14 agents in each round. Each row supplied the 
following information;  
• The experiment identifier, which was a code that identified a particular game 
with the experimental conditions used.  
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• The trial and round number for each row of data was then displayed.  
• The factor weightings (simulator conditions) for each round were displayed, 
the percentage of correct predictions and the average scaled rank.  
• The measures of how well the model predicted the moves of the human game 




The data produced by the simulator provides a mean of all 14 predictions in each round. The dependent variable ‘Average 
Scaled Prediction’ is visible here in column H. The factor weightings are visible in columns I through N. 
Table 3 : Comparison data 
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The “Percent Correct” variable seen in column E of Table 4 is a measurement of how 
accurately the model has predicted human moves. The scope of measurement that 
this variable provides is limited as it only counts the number of perfectly predicted 
exchanges per round. The number of perfectly predicted exchanges out of a 
maximum of 14 is then displayed as a percentage.  
The variable “Average Scaled Prediction” was selected as it provided a more 
accurate measure of the model’s performance. The model predicts each human 
participant’s move from 1 (perfect prediction) to 14 (furthest ranked participant from 
the participant that actually received the token). This variable then provided a 
method that quantified how close the model was to predicting human moves.  
The Average Scaled Predictions for each round were calculated by firstly, identifying 
the particular agent to whom each player made an allocation. Secondly, determining 
the corresponding likelihood score. Thirdly, computing the average of the likelihood 
scores across all 14 players for each round. This measure then provided an overall 






A table of means of the dependent variable “Average Scaled Prediction” with each 
factor in isolation to each other was created using the “tapply” function in R (Team, 
2014). This function allows a mean of the dependent variable to be calculated in 




The output data obtained from the simulator is hierarchical in nature, having games 
nested within experimental conditions. The assumption of independence is violated 
with this hierarchical data and consequently analytical methods such as analysis of 
variance would be inappropriate. The appropriate choice for hierarchical data sets is 
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multi-level modelling (Quené & Van den Bergh, 2004). Multi-level modelling is a 
robust procedure that can handle moderate violations of homoscedasticity and 
sphericity. This analysis, compared with a repeated measure ANOVA provides more 
power in estimating the effects. 
Researchers usually seek to accurately account for the influence that a selected 
independent variable has on the dependent variable. A danger to the interpretation 
of the results can occur when unexplained extraneous factors have an effect on the 
dependent variable and account for some of the variance. These random factors 
often do not have any theoretical interest yet it is important to account for these 
factors and the degree to which they influence the dependent variable (Albright & 
Marinova, 2010).  
Using standard analysis of variance models with hierarchical data can lead to 
unrealistic parameter estimates as the errors between units in a level are likely 
correlated (Albright & Marinova, 2010). In order to assess the correlation between 
level 2 conditions (games), an interclass correlation coefficient was calculated. In this 
case of the current study, the intraclass correlation coefficient was 0.06 at the game 
level. This means that 6% of the variance in the dependent variable can be 
explained by variance between the mean scores of games. An advantage for the use 
of multilevel modelling is that it would be able to account for this random variance 
and allow a more precise inference of the fixed effects (Quené & Van den Bergh, 
2004). 
The Netlogo simulator was coded to be able to run every possible combination of the 
six modelled exchange rules at three levels of 0, 50 and 100 for each human game. 
Every time the Netlogo simulator was run, a human game was uploaded and the 
simulator then ran a simulation for each combination of exchange rules at the three 
levels of weightings. A human game consisting of 40 rounds multiplied by 6 factors 
at three levels (40 × 36) resulted in a round summary sheet with 29160 rows of 
data. Each row of data was a summary of one round of play. The 40 rounds of data 
where the factor weightings were set to zero were removed which then resulted in a 
simulator output of 29120 rows of data. In order to analyse all of the simulations 
under one analysis, it was necessary to collate the sixteen datasets into one data set 
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that could be imported into R. The data were then analysed using the “lme4” 
package in R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
 
The results chapter is separated into four components. The first section addresses 
the question: Is prediction accuracy different over the six simulator conditions? The 
second section describes the multi-level model. The third section addresses the 
question: Do the simulator conditions lead to different levels of prediction accuracy 
over the four experimental conditions? Finally, the fourth section addresses the 
question: Which combination of simulator factors best predict human decision 
making in the four experimental conditions? 
 
Section 1: Effects of simulated factors in isolation across 16 games 
 
The primary aim of this section is to answer the question of whether prediction 
accuracy is different across simulated conditions. In order to achieve this, 
simulations had to be run for one factor at a time with all other factors excluded. This 
meant that only one factor contributed towards the Empathy Matrix in each 
simulation. Each factor was tested at two weightings of 50 and 100 with all other 
factors set to zero. The simulations were repeated over all 16 human games.  
Figure 4 represents the means for the dependent variable, Average Scaled 
Prediction, for each simulator condition at each level of weighting over 16 games. 
The error bars represent the standard deviation of the accuracy score for each factor 
weighting.  
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Figure 4: Mean prediction accuracy with factors in isolation 
 
The expected value for the dependent variable “Average Scaled Prediction” is the 
mean of the 14 predicted ranks (see Table 2) which is (M = .50, SD = 0.31). This 
means that if ranks were allocated randomly between 14 agents, the likelihood of an 
agent receiving any particular rank would be 0.5. This value then provides a 
theoretical baseline where in the case where every move was random, the expected 
value would be 0.5.   
As seen in Figure 4, the random weight at weight 50 (M = .49, SD = 0.08) and weight 
100 (M = .50, SD = 0.08) is equal to the expected value. This provides assurance 
that the methodology is sound and that a meaningful prediction would range 
between .5 and 1. The random factor, as it is not effectively modelling human 
behaviour was removed from the model in order to gain theoretically meaningful 
results from the simulations.  
Average Scaled Prediction Means with Factors in Isolation 
Random Fairness In-group bias Reciprocity Vicinity Self-interest
Mean at weight  50 0,499399 0,7563273 0,9749227 0,9700721 0,526262 0,9382126













Average Scaled Prediciton Means With Factors In Isolation
Mean at weight  50 Mean at weight  100
R Fairnes In-group bia Reci r it Vici it S lf-i t r t
0,49 (SD=0,08) 0,76 (SD=0,13) 0,97 (SD=0,01) 0,97 (SD=0,01) 0,53 (SD=0,08) 0,94 (SD=0,01)
0,50 (SD=0,08) 0,76 (SD=0,13) 0,95 (SD=0,08) 0,97 (SD=0,01) 0,53 (SD=0,08) 0,94 (SD=0,01) 
Average Scaled Prediction Means with Factors in Isolation 
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The vicinity factor at weight 50 (M = .53, SD = 0.08) and weight 100 (M = .53, SD = 
0.08) had a poor effect on prediction accuracy. The fact that these factors lead to 
prediction accuracy of around .5 implies that they are of very little theoretical 
importance in modelling human decision making in the VIAPPL games. These 
results provide rationale for removing these two factors from the agent-based model. 
It is expected that the exclusion of these two factors would lead to greater sensitivity 
in the final multi-level model analysis. 
The factors that led to the highest prediction accuracy were ingroup favouritism, 
reciprocity and self-interest. Reciprocity in both weights of 50 and 100 yielded a 
prediction accuracy of (M = .97, SD = 0.01). The standard deviations for reciprocity 
are very low which means that there is little variation in individual scores from the 
mean. This may indicate that reciprocity is a reliable factor in the agent-based model. 
Ingroup favouritism was more accurate at weight 50 (M = .97, SD = 0.01) than at 
weight 100 (M = .95, SD = 0.08). The standard deviation at weight 50 was much 
lower than at weight 100 which may indicate that ingroup favouritism, at weight 50, is 
more reliable with less variation between scores. Self-interest at both weights of 50 
and 100 led to a prediction accuracy of (M = .94, SD = 0.01). The standard 
deviations for both weights of self-interest were low which indicates that it is a 
reliable factor relative to the other factors. Fairness was less accurate than 
reciprocity, self-interest and ingroup favouritism and had a mean prediction accuracy 
of (M = .76, SD = 0.13) at both weights of 50 and 100. 
The reason fairness has a lower accuracy score to the higher scoring factors is due 
to the way fairness has been operationalised. Note that in Figure 3, the accuracy 
scores for ingroup favouritism, reciprocity and self-interest are in the range of .92 
and 1 (between rank 1 and 2). These high values, in comparison with fairness, are 
due to the fact that the measure of ingroup favouritism, reciprocity and self-interest 
are binary outcomes. Agents either gave to their ingroup or not, they either self-gave 
or they did not, and they either reciprocated or they did not. When these binary 
factors were used in a simulation without a factor that had more than two possible 
outcomes, the Average Scaled Prediction would be limited to the range between 
ranks 1 and 2. Fairness has a much larger variance with all 14 players being 
possibilities, therefore the ranks can have a maximum range of 14. The scale of the 
measure of accuracy dramatically increases when fairness is included and when this 
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factor is removed, the scale becomes far smaller. This effect has made comparisons 
between these simulations misleading.  
The standard deviation for self-interest was relatively high in comparison to these 
higher scoring factors. This may indicate that self-interest in addition to being a lower 
scoring factor, is less reliable with more variation between scores.   
The simulations were then run including every combination of fairness, ingroup 
favouritism, reciprocity and self-interest as contributors to the deciding Empathy 
Matrix. The removal of the random factor along with the proximity factor reduced the 
size of the resulting data considerably. With 4 factors at 3 levels (34) the total 
number of combinations were reduced to 81. The condition with every factor set to 
zero was removed which led to 80 combinations repeated over 40 rounds for each of 




Section 2: Multilevel model  
 
The dependent variable, Average Scaled Prediction, is a value between 0 and 1. 
Due to the fact that the expected value is .5, any meaningful results lie in the range 
between .5 and 1. This resulted in the dependent variable being negatively skewed. 
This pattern violated the assumption of normality for conducting a multi-level 
analysis. In order to proceed with the analysis, the data were transformed using an 
arcsine transformation (see Figure 5 and 6).  
 
 
One consequence of using a transformation to satisfy the assumption of normality is 
that the original scale of the dependent variable is lost (Lo & Andrews, 2015). 
Interpretation then becomes difficult as one cannot relate the new values to the 
original scale. Two methods were used in order to combat this problem, firstly a 
second analysis was run with the original untransformed variable which would supply 
beta regression coefficients in the original scale. These coefficients were reported in 
Figure 6: Histogram of the dependent 
variable Average Scaled Prediction 
Figure 5: Histogram of the dependent 
variable Average Scaled Prediction after 
transformation 
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conjunction with the coefficients from the transformed data. Secondly, a table is 
provided with the original scaled prediction ranks with the arcsine transformed 
equivalents in a corresponding column (see table 5). This table then visualises the 
comparable transformed dependent variable to the original scale.  
 







1 1 1.5707963267949 
2 0.923077 1.17600540709518 
3 0.846154 1.00872681246447 
4 0.769231 0.877636780375781 
5 0.692308 0.76468260426419 
6 0.615385 0.662874311600265 
7 0.538462 0.568610847986836 
8 0.461538 0.479728117409841 
9 0.384615 0.394790703033131 
10 0.307692 0.312766398560729 
11 0.230769 0.232867941087265 
12 0.153846 0.154459442784397 
13 0.076923 0.0769990635051488 
14 0 0 
Note. The scaled prediction rank is the value that is obtained by comparing the human players move to that of the simulated 




Since the data were hierarchical in nature, required attention was given to the 
specific nesting structure. The data were structured with games being nested within 
experimental conditions. Therefore, a null model was built with a random intercept at 
the game level. The intraclass correlation coefficient was 0.06 which meant that 6% 
of unexplained variance was the game level. This amount of random variance is not 
extremely high however it is high enough to justify the use of a multilevel model.  
The next model built was a model with the random intercept at the game level with 
the simulator factors and experimental factors added. This model proved a better fit 
than the null model. 
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The third model was built with three-way interactions between each simulator factor 
and the two experimental conditions of groups and inequality. This model was 
theoretically motivated as it would allow the observation of the relative importance of 
each exchange rule under each of the four experimental conditions. This model 
proved to be a better fit than the null model and the model with main effects. Table 6 
displays the comparisons between the three models.  




Model Description BIC Significance test 
Null model Intercept only -20145  
Main 
effects 
Null + Reciprocity + Fairness+ Self-
interest + Group 






+ all 3-way interactions of 
Individual.Group*Equality.Inequality 
BY Reciprocity, Fairness, Self-
interest and Group. 
-79669 χ2(25) = 8272.8, p < 
0.001 
 
It should be noted that the model including three-way interactions has a much lower 
BIC value than the null model and the model with main effects. This lower BIC value 
indicates a better fit to the data. The Chi-square test for the final model (χ2(25) = 
8272.8, p < 0.001) indicates that the difference is significant.  
The intercept for the final model with three-way interactions was (β = 1.302, SE = 
0.015, p < .001). For interpretation, the intercept for the same model with the 
untransformed dependent variable is (β = 0.983, SE = 0.010, p < .001). This can be 
considered the expected mean for the dependent variable, Average Scaled 
Prediction. Thus, the expected mean of the variable Average Scaled Prediction 
is .98.  
The beta coefficients for each fixed effect represent the increase or decrease that 
would be observed in the expected score (the intercept) of the dependent variable 
with a one unit increase in the predictor, with all other predictors held constant 
(Albright & Marinova, 2010).  The ANOVA summary table (Table 7) of fixed effects is 
displayed below. The summary table for the comparisons between categories can be 
found at Appendix 1.  
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Table 6: Multilevel model with three-way interactions 
 
Type III Analysis of Variance Table with Satterthwaite's method 
Fixed effects: Sum Sq Mean Sq NumDF DenDF F value Pr(>F) 
Individual.Group 0.01 0.01 1 16 0.7491 0.3995443 
Equality.Inequality 0.04 0.04 1 16 3.4715 0.0808969 . 
Reciprocity.weight 0.37 0.19 2 51184 15.1555 2.630e-07 *** 
self.Interest.weight 14.51 7.26 2 51184 593.2612 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Group.Weight 15.49 7.75 2 51184 633.2602 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Fairness.weight 1264.43 632.21 2 51184 51683.6841 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Individual.Group:Equality.Inequality 0.33 0.33 1 16 26.8503 9.088e-05 *** 
Individual.Group:Reciprocity.weight 0.02 0.01 2 51184 1.0030 0.3668016 
Equality.Inequality:Reciprocity.weight 0.53 0.27 2 51184 21.7849 3.491e-10 *** 
Individual.Group:self.Interest.weight 5.76 2.88 2 51184 235.4504 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Equality.Inequality:self.Interest.weight 11.90 5.95 2 51184 486.5757 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Individual.Group:Group.Weight 25.36 12.68 2 51184 1036.4657 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Equality.Inequality:Group.Weight 18.60 9.30 2 51184 760.3994 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Individual.Group:Fairness.weight 0.96 0.48 2 51184 39.0571 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Equality.Inequality:Fairness.weight 19.16 9.58 2 51184 783.0238 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Individual.Group:Equality.Inequality:Reciprocity.weight 0.22 0.11 2 51184 9.0507 0.0001175 *** 
Individual.Group:Equality.Inequality:self.Interest.weight 0.12 0.06 2 51184 5.0152 0.0066398 ** 
Individual.Group:Equality.Inequality:Group.Weight 1.36 0.68 2 51184 55.7155 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Individual.Group:Equality.Inequality:Fairness.weight 23.77 11.88 2 51184 971.5869 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001.   
Note. The p-values for main effects and interactions are mostly significant. This effect is likely attributable to the large 
sample size. 
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Section 3: Effects of simulated factors across experimental conditions.  
 
The primary aim of this section is to answer the question: In which experimental 
condition does each simulator factor lead to higher prediction accuracy? The 
necessity of this analysis is due to the fact that human exchange behaviour differs 
under the various experimental conditions. We therefore expected theoretically 
interesting interactions to occur between the simulator conditions and the four 
experimental conditions.  
In order to interpret these three-way interactions, it was necessary to create 
visualised representations of the interactions. Three-way interaction graphs were 
created from the final multi-level model using R’s predict function to calculate the 
mean model predictions and their standard errors. The “ggplot2” function was then 
used to create graphs that depicted these interactions (Wickham, 2016).The points 
in each graph represent the mean model predictions in each weighting of the 
independent variable. These means were created by calculating the average 
prediction accuracy over the entire dataset. The error bars represent the standard 
errors of the predictions. 
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Figure 7: Three-way interaction between the group condition, the inequality condition 
and the manipulation of the ingroup favouritism weighting. 
Note. F (2, 51184) = 55.72, P = < 0.001 
The interaction between ingroup favouritism with the group and inequality conditions, 
when weighted at 50, had a statistically significant effect on prediction accuracy in 
comparison to simulations with ingroup favouritism weight set to zero (β = 0.023, SE 
= 0.005, p < .001). Ingroup favouritism weighted at 100 was also statistically 
significant accuracy in comparison to simulations with ingroup favouritism weight set 
to zero (β = 0.051, SE = 0.005, p < .001). For interpretation, the coefficients from the 
analysis with the untransformed dependent variable are given. Ingroup favouritism at 
weight 50 was (β = 0.015, SE = 0.003, p < .001) and at 100 was (β = 0.030, SE = 
0.003, p < .001). This means that at weight 50, the predicted mean would 
increase .015 for every one unit increase in ingroup favouritism weight with all other 
independent variables held constant. At weight 100, the increase would be .030.   
It is noted that in both individual conditions, increasing the weighting of ingroup 
favouritism leads to reduced prediction accuracy. This is a logical and expected 
outcome as group membership was not visible to the human participants. An 
interesting note is that the individual condition under the inequality condition leads to 
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a lesser reduction in accuracy than the individual condition under equality. A 
potential explanation for this could be that in the inequality condition, though groups 
were not visible, there existed a high and low status group visible by each 
participant’s token balance. This could have led to a weaker process of social 
categorisation which subsequently led to ingroup favouritism.   
The equal status group condition led to reduced prediction accuracy with an increase 
in ingroup favouritism weighting. The accuracy scores under this condition are high 
as seen by the relative position of the data points on the y-axis. The decrease in 
prediction accuracy leads us to the conclusion that another factor is responsible for 
this accuracy. The results of analysis 3 confirm that reciprocity in this condition was a 
more important factor in predicting human moves (See Figure 12). As ingroup 
favouritism was reduced, reciprocity was able to become more evident.  
The weighting of ingroup favouritism under the unequal group condition led to an 
increase in prediction accuracy. This means that ingroup favouritism was a powerful 
determinate of the decision making in token allocation.  
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Figure 8: Three-way interaction between the group condition, the inequality condition 
and the manipulation of the reciprocity weighting 
F (2, 51184) = 9.05, P = < 0.001 
 
The interaction between reciprocity with the group and inequality conditions, when 
weighted at 50, did not have a statistically significant effect on prediction accuracy in 
comparison to simulations with reciprocity weight set to zero (β = -0.008, SE = 0.005, 
p = 0.10760). Reciprocity weighted at 100 did however have a significant effect on 
the dependent variable in comparison to simulations with reciprocity weight set to 
zero (β = -0.020, SE = 0.005, p < .001). For interpretation, the coefficients from the 
analysis with the original dependent variable are given. Reciprocity at weight 50 was 
(β = -0.006, SE = 0.003, p = 0.4440) and at 100 was (β = -0.012, SE = 0.003, p 
< .001). 
The weighting of reciprocity has, in most conditions, resulted in very little difference 
in prediction accuracy. It is noted that the weighting of reciprocity in the individual 
inequality condition, leads to an increase in prediction accuracy.  
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Figure 9: Three-way interaction between the group condition, the inequality condition 
and the manipulation of the fairness weighting 
 
Note. F (2, 51184) = 971.58, P = < 0.001 
The interaction between fairness with the group and inequality conditions, when 
weighted at 50, had a statistically significant effect on prediction accuracy in 
comparison to simulations with fairness weight set to zero (β = -0.176, SE = 0.005, p 
< .001). Fairness weighted at 100 was also statistically significant in comparison to 
simulations with fairness weight set to zero (β = -0.191, SE = 0.005, p < .001).  For 
interpretation, the coefficients from the analysis with the original dependent variable 
are given. Fairness at weight 50 was (β = -0.123, SE = 0.003, p < .001) and at 100 
were (β = -0.131, SE = 0.003, p < .001). The beta coefficients are far larger than 
most of the three-way interactions reported. The coefficients are negative which 
indicates a reduction in prediction accuracy. 
The fairness factor as had negative effect on prediction accuracy over all four 
experimental conditions. The fairness factor, when weighted in all four experimental 
conditions, leads to a reduction in prediction accuracy. The prediction accuracy as 
noted on the y-axis, drops from 1.2 to under 1 on the arcsine transformed scale 
(please refer to Table 5) when fairness is introduced. This means that with fairness 
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excluded, the average rank falls between position 1 and 2 and when fairness is 
included, the rank drops to position 4. This effect is attributable to the previously 
discussed problem of fairness being mathematically disadvantaged in comparison to 
the three other decision rules with binary outcomes.  
 
Figure 10: Three-way interaction between the group condition, the inequality 
condition and the manipulation of the self-interest weighting 
 
Note. F (2, 51184) = 5.02, P = 0.0066398 
The self-interest weighting, when weighted at 50, had a statistically significant effect 
on prediction accuracy in comparison to simulations with self-interest weight set to 
zero (β = 0.013, SE = 0.005, p < .001). Self-interest weighted at 100 was also 
statistically significant in comparison to simulations with self-interest weight set to 
zero (β = 0.013, SE = 0.005, p < .001).  For interpretation, the coefficients from the 
analysis with the original dependent variable are given. Self-interest at weight 50 
was (β = 0.005, SE = 0.003, p = 0.05337) and at 100 were (β = 0.006, SE = 0.003, p 
= .05227). These coefficients are small which indicates that self-interest did not 
make a large impact on prediction accuracy.  
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The weighting of self-interest had a positive effect on prediction accuracy in the 
individual condition with inequality. This finding suggests that self-giving was 
common in the human game and the higher the weighting in the agent-based model, 
the more the data matched that of the human game. In the remaining three 
conditions, the weighting of self-interest led to a decrease in accuracy, an interesting 
note is the difference between these three conditions. The weighting of self-interest 
in the group condition without inequality had the largest difference in prediction 
accuracy. Self-interest weighted in this condition reduced accuracy. The fact that 
self-interest reduced accuracy to this extent suggests that self-giving was not 
common in the human games under this experimental condition. The measured 
prediction accuracy in this condition is likely attributable to another factor. The 
reduction in weighting of self-interest allowed the better predicting factor to be more 
evident.   
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Section 4: The best fitting combination of factors in each of the four 
experimental conditions.  
 
The primary aim of this section is to answer the question of which combination of 
factors best predicts the data of the human games under the four experimental 
conditions. The top ten combinations are reported for each experimental condition. 
In order to obtain the best predicting combinations, the data were ranked based on 
accuracy. The data structure is as follows; there are four simulator factors each with 
three levels. These factors, when crossed in every possible combination, result in a 
total of 81 combinations. The combination with all four factors set to zero was 
removed as it resulted in a mathematical error. Each combination was repeated over 
40 rounds for each of the sixteen human games, this resulted in a total number of 
51,200 measurements.  
The predict function in R was used to calculate predicted values, these were then 
inserted into a new column in the data frame. The data were then aggregated at the 
game level which gave a mean prediction accuracy for each combination. The data 
were then ranked based on the predicted values from most accurate to least 
accurate. The top ten combinations for each experimental condition were used to 
create the visualisations below. Each bar represents the transformed dependent 
variable, average scaled prediction, for each factor combination. The error bars 
represent the standard errors of the predicted values.  
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Figure 11: The best fitting combinations for the equal status individual condition 
 
 
In the equal status individual condition, the most accurate simulator factor for 
matching the simulated data to that of the human games was reciprocity. Reciprocity 
at weight 100 yielded a prediction accuracy of (M = 1.289, SE = 0.003368). The 
second highest prediction was reciprocity weighted at 50 (M = 1.287, SE = 
0.003368). The third highest was self-interest weighted at 100 (M = 1.259, SE = 
0.003368).  
The most accurate predictions in this experimental condition were single factors in 
isolation from other factors. When two or more factors were combined, prediction 
accuracy dropped substantially. It is noted that the inclusion of ingroup favouritism 
had a negative effect on prediction accuracy in this condition, this effect is visible in 
the three-way interaction graph (Figure 7). The fairness factor when included in 
isolation, at weight 100, reduced prediction accuracy to the point that it was ranked 
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Figure 12: The best fitting combinations for the equal status group condition 
 
 
In the equal status group condition, the most accurate simulator factor for matching 
the simulated data to that of the human games was reciprocity. Reciprocity at weight 
100 yielded a prediction accuracy of (M = 1.298, SE = 0.001164). The second 
highest prediction was reciprocity weighted at 50 (M = 1.290, SE = 0.001164). The 
third highest was ingroup favouritism weighted at 50 (M = 1.268, SE = 0.001164). 
The most accurate predictions in this condition can be attributed to reciprocity and 
ingroup favouritism. Reciprocity is more effective weighted at 100 than 50. Of 
interest is that ingroup favouritism weighted at 50 leads to a better prediction than if it 
were weighted at 100. Self-interest, when included in this experimental condition, 
results in a notable reduction in prediction accuracy. The fairness factor when 
included in isolation, at weight 100, reduced prediction accuracy to the point that it 
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Figure 13: The best fitting combinations for the unequal status individual condition  
 
 
In the unequal status individual condition, the most accurate simulator factors in 
matching the human data was a combination of self-interest and reciprocity. 
Reciprocity and self-interest both weighted at 100 yielded a prediction accuracy of 
(M = 1.279, SE = 0.00273). The second and third place in accuracy were different 
combinations of these two factors. Self-interest at weight 100 in isolation (M = 1.270, 
SE = 0.00273) led to a higher prediction accuracy than reciprocity at weight 100 in 
isolation (M = 1.260, SE = 0.00273).  
Referring back to Figure 8 and Figure 10, it is noted that in the section of the plot that 
displays individual condition with inequality, both self-interest and reciprocity led to 
higher prediction when the weighting was increased. In the current visualisation, it is 
evident that a combination of these two factors tend to strengthen each other and 
together lead to a higher prediction accuracy than if they were in isolation. Ingroup 
favouritism, when weighted at 50 in isolation to other factors ranked position number 
19 with a mean prediction accuracy of (M = 1.214, SE = 0.00273). The inclusion of 
the fairness factor in this experimental setting led to a dramatic decline in prediction 
accuracy. The fairness factor when included in isolation, at weight 100, reduced 
prediction accuracy to the point that it was ranked position 41 and had a mean 
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Figure 14: The best fitting combinations for the unequal status group condition 
 
 
In the unequal status group condition, the most accurate simulator factor for 
matching the simulated data to that of the human games was ingroup favouritism. 
Ingroup favouritism at weight 100 yielded a prediction accuracy of (M = 1.262, SE = 
0.00116). The second highest prediction was a combination of ingroup favouritism 
weighted at 100 and reciprocity weighted at 50 (M = 1.260, SE = 0.00116). The third 
highest combination was ingroup favouritism weighted at 100 and reciprocity 
weighted at 100 (M = 1.257, SE = 0.00116).   
Ingroup favouritism was the best predictor of human behaviour in this experimental 
setting. This finding is also present in Figure 7 where an increase in the weighting of 
ingroup favouritism led to a higher rates of prediction accuracy. The combination of 
ingroup favouritism and reciprocity has also led to high prediction rates.  
The self-interest factor tended to reduce prediction accuracy. Self-interest at weight 
50 combined with ingroup favouritism at weight 100 has been ranked in position 7 
with a mean prediction accuracy of (M = 1.242, SE = 0.00116). The fairness factor 
when included in isolation, at weight 100, reduced prediction accuracy to the point 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
Exchange is a critical part of human interaction and for this reason social exchange 
theory has been a major area of focus in the field of social psychology. The ability for 
this theory to provide a framework to understand social structure has been 
demonstrated since Homans’ early work in 1958. One area of social exchange 
theory that has in the past been critiqued is the dominant assumption of rationality 
that was mainly argued by Homans (1958). Meeker (1971) argued that rationality is 
an important factor, yet it should be given a far narrower definition than it has 
enjoyed in the past. She goes on to argue how multiple situations exist whereby 
rationality, in its primitive definition, is constrained. Emerson (1976) echoed this view 
and argued that the weighing up of rewards is an explanation for some exchange 
situations, but not all. Rationality could rather be thought of as an individual having 
weighed up the consequences associated with a particular exchange, but not 
necessarily make their decision based solely on profit maximisation. There are many 
cases whereby individuals do seem to act irrationally in the economic sense, fairness 
considerations being an illustrative example (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
Meeker (1971) sought to explain exchanges as decisions made by individuals faced 
with a potential exchange. In her schema, the problem of rationality is removed 
entirely. Rational choices, or simply profit maximisation, could then be treated as just 
a possible orientation used by individuals in certain situations (Emerson, 1976). 
Meeker went on to define five exchange rules of reciprocation, ingroup gain, 
competition, altruism, and status consistency. These exchange rules are argued to 
be normative and as such they will change based on the context of the situation. It 
can be expected that they may, in certain contexts, be supportive of one another; 
meaning individuals may select and use more than one exchange rule at a time. It is 
also expected that under some conditions, certain exchange rules will be at conflict 
with a larger governing norm. The process in which an individual adopts a particular 
exchange rule over the alternatives is a complex one and warrants a brief discussion 
on norms in general.  
Norms are socially sanctioned behaviour in response to a particular stimulus. Norms 
are agreed upon socially and are maintained by approval for following the norm or 
disapproval if the norm is violated. At the personal level, anxiety and guilt resulting 
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from the fear of punishment results in an internalisation of the norm. This 
internalisation can even guide behaviour when there is no one around to impose 
punishment for violating the norm. Elster (1989) uses an example of people adhering 
to a norm against picking one’s nose in front of strangers that they will never see 
again. The strangers will never be able to impose punishments, yet people ordinarily 
will be sure not to violate this norm. This suggests that norms have great power in 
guiding individual behaviour due to the strong emotions that they illicit (Festre, 2010). 
Norms within the VIAPPL exchange environment may be formal or informal. Meeker 
(1971) gives examples of informal norms, such as following norms that are followed 
by others, commitments that are formed through repeated exchange, or simple 
imitation of others around them. Formal norms could include role expectations or 
expectations of which exchange rule would be normative for a particular relationship. 
Ingroup favouritism, for example, is argued to be a dominant societal norm that 
prescribes ingroup favouring behaviour in a new and novel group situation (Iacoviello 
& Spears, 2018).  
In the current research, a reconceptualised set of exchange rules has been 
proposed, drawing on recent research in exchange. Reciprocity, fairness, proximity, 
self-interest and ingroup favouritism have received recent empirical support and 
have been selected as candidates for an accurate model of social exchange.  
Cropanzano et al. (2005) raised an important point; that very little research has 
examined the “black box” of social exchange. That is, the actual process of 
exchange has yet to be fully uncovered. Agent-based modelling has been used in 
the current research to model exchange behaviour from individual agent level 
decision making. Agent-based simulations hold great potential for studying 
emergence; the repeated interactions between individuals that lead to macrolevel 
behaviour. Most social exchange research has relied upon experimental research in 
laboratory settings. This research has been scientifically useful in that it creates an 
environment which is largely free of extraneous variables. The ability to simulate 
microlevel behaviour from the ground up has allowed the ability to study particular 
agent level decisions and how that has evolved through interaction into the macro 
level structure that we observe empirically. With the ability to quantitatively compare 
the results from the agent-based simulation to that of empirical data, we have been 
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able to uncover the following: Firstly, which exchange rule human participants are 
relying upon the most; secondly, which exchange rules are most relied upon under 
each experimental condition; and thirdly, under each condition, which combination 
exchange rules are most fitting to the empirical data.   
An overview of the results of the current research 
 
The data in the current study were analysed using three separate analyses. Each 
analysis provided a particular perspective of how each simulator factor and the 
interactions between factors were predicting human moves. In order to arrive at a 
more holistic view of how accurately the model predicted human behaviour, it was 
necessary to discuss the results of each exchange rule with reference being drawn 
from all three analyses. An overview of the results of each exchange rule have been 
discussed below.  
(Note: The random giving and proximity exchange rules both led to accuracy scores 
that were clustered around the expected random value. These factors were then 
removed from the model in order to refine and create a better predicting model, and 
as such they have been excluded in the current discussion.)  
Ingroup-favouritism 
 
The results from analysis 1 indicated that the simulator predicted human moves very 
accurately when the ingroup favouritism exchange rule was modelled. Ingroup 
favouritism was expected to be a good predictor of human moves as favouring ones 
ingroup within the minimal group paradigm is a robust and well-known outcome. The 
original study using the VIAPPL application did indeed find that ingroup favouritism 
emerges over time in a stable fashion in the group conditions (Durrheim et al., 2016). 
As the data used in the current study was the same data used in the VIAPPL study, 
it was a safe assumption that this factor would score highly. 
Under analysis 2 and 3, it was found that ingroup favouritism was a high predictor of 
behaviour under the experimental condition of groups with unequal starting 
conditions, but was not a good predictor in the remaining three conditions. Ingroup 
favouritism was not expected to be a good predictor in the individual conditions, as 
group identity was not visible to the participants. A somewhat surprising finding was 
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that ingroup favouritism was not a commonly used exchange rule in the group 
condition with equal starting conditions. In this condition, it appears that reciprocity 
was a more relied upon exchange rule. This finding illustrates the normative 
pressures that are evident in exchange networks. Being loyal to the ingroup is a 
robust phenomenon within the minimal group paradigm, yet the normative pressure 
to reciprocate to those who have given to you in the past was stronger. One can 
conclude that inequality in these experiments had an enhancing effect on ingroup 
favouritism. This finding is supported by a recent study by Lei and Vesely (2010) 
which aimed to research the effect that income inequality has on the development of 
ingroup favouritism. Their findings concluded that ingroup favouritism was only found 
within members of the wealthier group. Additionally, the participants that were poor 
were more trusting towards the wealthier group than towards the poor.  
Reciprocity 
 
The exchange rule of reciprocity was a very high predictor of human decision making 
in most of the experimental conditions. In both conditions of group and individual with 
equal starting conditions, reciprocity was the modelled exchange rule that best 
predicted human behaviour. The experimental condition of individuals with unequal 
starting conditions was predicted best by an equal combination of reciprocation and 
self-interest. This is a surprising finding as these exchange rules could be thought of 
as competing with each other. A possible explanation for this finding would be that a 
dominant norm of economic profit maximisation is constrained by the normative 
obligation to cooperate with those that have been helpful in the past. The self-
interest norm is likely induced by the inequality of wealth between participants, which 
as Miller (2001) argued, is often induced by the context. This finding is an illustrative 
example of the conflict that can arise between exchange rules, on one side there is a 
clear rationality in the participants decision making, but there is an equal normative 
obligation to cooperate with others.  
Overall, there is much support for the generic norm of reciprocity argued by 
Gouldner (1960), yet it is clear that contesting norms such as ingroup favouritism 





The modelled exchange rule of self-interest was a good predictor in the individual 
condition with unequal starting conditions. A previously discussed self-interest was 
the best predictor of human behaviour when paired with reciprocity. In the individual 
condition with equal starting conditions, self-interest did feature in eight of the top ten 
combinations with reciprocity being in the top two. These results seem to indicate 
that self-interest was normatively promoted, yet it was constrained by the stronger 
cooperative norm of reciprocity.  
The pattern of economic rationality with competing normative considerations of 
cooperation have gained the attention of many economists (Festre, 2010). 
Fairness 
 
The fairness factor under analysis 1 had a mean Average Scaled Prediction of 0.76. 
This accuracy is higher than our expected value of 0.5 which means that the 
modelling of fairness is indeed predicting human behaviour.  
When referring to analysis 2, the fairness factor, when weighted in all four 
experimental conditions, leads to a reduction in prediction accuracy. The prediction 
accuracy drops from 1.2 to under 1 on the arcsine transformed scale when fairness 
is introduced. This means that with fairness excluded, the average rank falls 
between position 1 and 2, and when fairness is included, the rank drops to position 
4. This effect is attributable to the previously discussed problem of fairness being 





The ability to generate macro level phenomena from a set of simple rules and then 
compare these macro level outcomes to existing data from human experiments has 
informed us of which decision rules are most relied upon under each experimental 
condition.  
86  
We have also been able to observe how rules interact with each other to form these 
macro level outcomes. It is noted, for example, that ingroup favouritism and 
reciprocity share a relationship, as they are both in the top combinations in the group 
conditions. Durrheim et al. (2016) shed some light on this with the explanation that 
participants are likely to expect reciprocation to be more likely within their own group 
than with the outgroup. Ingroup favouritism is then elevated due to participants 
expecting their token allocations to be likely returned by ingroup members. The 
results of the current research indicate a dynamic interplay between these two 
factors.  
Reciprocity also interacted with self-interest in the individual condition, crossed with 
inequality. Self-interest as noted by Miller (2001), may be induced by the context. 
The unequal starting conditions may have induced a pattern of self-giving, though it 
is also possible that select participants modelled self-giving, and this behaviour then 
became normative with other participants. Further simulations investigating temporal 
patterns of allocation behaviour may be able to uncover these trends.  
The relationship between ingroup favouritism and self-interest is interesting in that 
the group conditions, where participants were aware of their group belonging, were 
less likely to engage in self-giving behaviour. The individual conditions with equal 
and unequal starting conditions tended to see more self-interest. These results 
suggest that ingroup favouritism was far stronger than self-interest under the minimal 
group situation.  
Reflections on method 
 
The approach to agent-based modelling in this research has been novel in that it has 
sought to be highly descriptive which is very different from the “keep it simple stupid” 
approach. The KISS principle is highly favoured due to the inherent problem with 
agent-based models that become too complicated with too many rules. When a 
model has too many rules, it can become very difficult to gain any meaningful results 
from the data. The method demonstrated in the current research quantitatively 
compares the simulated data to that of the human data. This comparison then allows 
researchers to abandon the KISS principle in favour of models that can become 
highly descriptive. The ability to refine a model through a sensitivity analysis, that is 
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to add or remove factors based on the comparison with empirical data, allows 
researchers the ability to test theory (Thiele, Kurth, & Grimm, 2014).  
Limitations and areas for future research 
 
A limitation in the current research that could be addressed in future research is the 
way in which fairness is modelled. As mentioned in the methods chapter, a smaller 
scale of measurement was inadvertently introduced when fairness was completely 
excluded from the final Empathy Matrix. This meant that comparisons between 
simulations that included fairness and ones that did not were misleading. For 
publication, this limitation will be overcome by simply changing the weightings of the 
simulated exchange rules. In the current study, the rules were weighted at three 
levels with increments of 50. This resulted in each exchange rule being weighted at 
0, 50 or 100. When weighted at 0, the exchange rule was mathematically cancelled 
out entirely. The proposed weightings of 1, 50 and 99 will overcome the problem of 
scale by ensuring that no simulated exchange rule will be fully excluded from the 
final Empathy Matrix.   
A second limitation in this study would be that the analysis did not include a temporal 
aspect which would allow the observation of norms emerging over time. The current 
research has modelled behaviour from interpersonal interactions and has compared 
the macrolevel outcomes of the simulation to empirical data. Future research could 
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Appendix 1: Multilevel model results table 
 
Fixed effects:                                               Coef. 
    Std. 
Err.     Df     T-value            P-value 
(Intercept) 1.302379 0.015274 17.248258 85.268 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Individual.Group1 0.001414 0.021601 17.248258 0.065 0.94855 
Equality.Inequality1 -0.050938 0.021601 17.248258 -2.358 0.03041 * 
Reciprocity.weight50 -0.015140 0.002404 51184.000002 -6.297 0.000000000306 *** 
Reciprocity.weight100 -0.012546 0.002404 51184.000013 -5.218 0.000000181663 *** 
self.Interest.weight50 -0.043379 0.002404 51184.000015 -18.042 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
self.Interest.weight100 -0.042554 0.002404 51184.000016 -17.698 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Group.Weight50 -0.104499 0.002404 51184.000011 -43.462 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Group.Weight100 -0.123138 0.002404 51184.000017 -51.214 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Fairness.weight50 -0.354670 0.002404 51184.000016 -147.509 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Fairness.weight100 -0.340735 0.002404 51184.000017 -141.714 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Individual.Group1:Equality.Inequality1 -0.056826 0.030548 17.248257 -1.860 0.07999 . 
Individual.Group1:Reciprocity.weight50 0.001715 0.003400 51184.000017 0.504 0.61405 
Individual.Group1:Reciprocity.weight100 0.006751 0.003400 51184.000029 1.985 0.04710 * 
Equality.Inequality1:Reciprocity.weight50 0.019200 0.003400 51184.000017 5.647 0.000000016446 *** 
Equality.Inequality1:Reciprocity.weight100 0.021468 0.003400 51184.000029 6.314 0.000000000275 *** 
Individual.Group1:self.Interest.weight50 -0.045480 0.003400 51184.000030 -13.375 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Individual.Group1:self.Interest.weight100 -0.056424 0.003400 51184.000029 -16.594 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Equality.Inequality1:self.Interest.weight50 0.055590 0.003400 51184.000030 16.349 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Equality.Inequality1:self.Interest.weight100 0.061148 0.003400 51184.000029 17.983 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Individual.Group1:Group.Weight50 0.068666 0.003400 51184.000027 20.194 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Individual.Group1:Group.Weight100 0.079751 0.003400 51184.000032 23.454 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Equality.Inequality1:Group.Weight50 0.067243 0.003400 51184.000027 19.775 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Equality.Inequality1:Group.Weight100 0.058744 0.003400 51184.000032 17.276 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
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Individual.Group1:Fairness.weight50 0.109053 0.003400 51184.000033 32.071 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Individual.Group1:Fairness.weight100 0.103666 0.003400 51184.000033 30.487 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Equality.Inequality1:Fairness.weight50 0.008358 0.003400 51184.000033 2.458 0.01397 * 
Equality.Inequality1:Fairness.weight100 0.010294 0.003400 51184.000034 3.027 0.00247 ** 
Individual.Group1:Equality.Inequality1:Reciprocity.weight50 -0.007738 0.004809 51184.000025 -1.609 0.10760 
Individual.Group1:Equality.Inequality1:Reciprocity.weight100 -0.020237 0.004809 51184.000036 -4.208 0.000025769401 *** 
Individual.Group1:Equality.Inequality1:self.Interest.weight50 0.013091 0.004809 51184.000037 2.722 0.00648 ** 
Individual.Group1:Equality.Inequality1:self.Interest.weight100 0.013372 0.004809 51184.000036 2.781 0.00542 ** 
Individual.Group1:Equality.Inequality1:Group.Weight50 0.022744 0.004809 51184.000033 4.730 0.000002255046 *** 
Individual.Group1:Equality.Inequality1:Group.Weight100 0.050635 0.004809 51184.000038 10.530 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Individual.Group1:Equality.Inequality1:Fairness.weight50 -0.176080 0.004809 51184.000040 -36.616 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Individual.Group1:Equality.Inequality1:Fairness.weight100 -0.191347 0.004809 51184.000039 -39.791 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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